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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines Iranian foreign policy from 1979 to 2009.  Five different 
explanatory models are evaluated using four well-documented historical examples.  The 
goal of the project is to determine which, if any, of these five commonly used 
explanatory models possesses the most promise as a predictive tool for policymakers and 
intelligence analysts. 
Iranian involvement in the Lebanon Hostage Crisis, their support to Hezbollah, 
anti-Israel policy, and ongoing nuclear development program provide the context for 
evaluating realist, ideological, factionalist, constructivist, and two-level game theory 
models for explaining Iranian foreign policy.  Aspects of each theory are assimilated by 
two-level game theory in such a way as to allow a large degree of explanatory flexibility.  
Iterative competition among the various interests of the state and political factions, as 
well as ideological and cultural factors, contribute significantly to each of the historical 
examples.  Two-level game theory is identified as the model possessing the most promise 
for explaining Iranian state behavior during the period under study. 
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I. MAKING SENSE OF IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY, 1979–2009 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Questions regarding the motivations of U.S. adversaries lead policymakers to 
resort to a variety of theoretical frameworks explaining state behavior.  Even though a 
single, universal theoretical model for explaining state behavior may not exist, this paper 
aims to isolate which of several leading international relations theories best explains the 
Islamic Republic of Iran’s behavior.  I examine four key historical instances of Iranian 
foreign policymaking, according to five competing theories of international relations, to 
identify the most consistent theory.  The four historical examples of Iranian state 
behavior are: (1) the Lebanon hostage crisis, (2) Iran’s support to Hezbollah, (3) Iran’s 
anti-Israel policy, and (4) Iran’s nuclear development program.  The five theories applied 
to each example are: (1) realism, (2) ideological explanations, (3) factionalism, (4) 
constructivism, and (5) two-level game theory. 
B. WHY EXPLAIN IRAN’S FOREIGN POLICY? 
Iran’s foreign policy behavior is among the most pressing security challenges 
facing the world today.  Listed by the U.S. Department of State as a sponsor of terror and 
developing a nuclear capability in the heart of the Middle East, understanding Iran’s 
intentions and motivations is clearly in the national interest of the United States.  It may 
be possible to predict probable Iranian responses to future diplomatic or military actions 
through a proper understanding and rigorous modeling of historical Iranian state 
behavior.  
A variety of theories offer explanations for Iranian state behavior since the 
revolution.  Each of five leading international relations theories implies one or more 
rational strategies for U.S. foreign policy.  First, balance of power realism suggests that 
Iran’s ambitions serve its national security interests by increasing its power.  Secondly, 
balance of threat theorists claim that Iranian state behavior is the rational outcome of 
Iran’s perception of the offensive intentions of the U.S. and Israel.  Both balance-of-
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power and balance-of-threat sub-species of realism suggest possible diplomatic solutions 
to the current impasse between Iran and the U.S., though their approaches and likely 
outcomes may vary.  Third, proponents of ideological explanations for Iranian state 
behavior, focus on Khomeini’s political theology and its legacy and attempt to construct a 
foreign policy that caters to assumed internal beliefs.  Fourth, factional explanations take 
into account the multiple, competing, internal interests comprising Iran’s political system 
and economy, and tend to drive policies such as “targeted sanctions” in order to punish 
factions inherently opposed to U.S. interests.  Constructivist claims that cultural 
determinants play an important role, stressing the importance of both national and 
religious heritage.1  Fifth, game theorists take multiple levels and layers of political and 
economic interaction into account, including internal political factionalism and 
international state-level interactions.   This thesis examines the extent to which each of 
these theories successfully describes Iranian foreign policy. 
The Lebanese hostage crisis, Iranian support to Hezbollah, Iran’s anti-Israel 
policy, and the Iranian nuclear development program are four historical examples of 
Iranian foreign policy under examination .  These examples, in particular, represent 
events central to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iran.  A 
thorough examination of each, using several different theories, may provide a more 
appropriate approach by which U.S. policymakers can re-engage Iran diplomatically.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Explaining Iranian foreign policy is difficult for a number of reasons.  From a 
strictly realist perspective, Iran’s behavior may seem maddeningly inconsistent.  
Decisions made by the leadership to prolong the war with Iraq and export the revolution 
to Lebanon were made, by all internal accounts, in order to support moral-religious 
imperatives of the revolution.  Realist explanations for the same events seem convoluted 
at best, given the relative weakness of Iran and its ability to independently sustain 
expansionist policies at that time.  Ideological explanations for Iranian foreign policy run 
                                                 
1  Ali Ansari, "Civilizational Identity and Foreign Policy: The Case of Iran," in The Limits of Culture: 
Islam and Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006): 246. 
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into similar problems, with Iran supporting ideological rivals while turning a blind eye to 
the actions of corrupt allies such as Syria, illustrated by Iran’s cynical support for Syria 
after the Hama massacre in 1982.  Factional explanations fail to account for what little 
consistency does exist in Iranian foreign policy, from the time of the Shah, through the 
Khomeini and post-Khomeini eras.  Factional explanations seem to offer less of a theory 
for explaining Iranian foreign policy than providing a play-by-play account of how that 
policy was implemented.  Two-level game theory offers a hybrid approach that takes the 
best of both realist and factional explanations, but fails to account for some of Iran’s 
seemingly dictatorial policy decisions. 
Though each of the five international relations theories cited above possesses 
explanatory power, the key question driving an empirically justified theoretical 
framework remains which theory offers the most consistent explanation for Iranian state 
behavior.  Three criteria guide this determination: 
1. As with any scientific theory—physical or social—the explanation must 
be falsifiable. 
2. The explanation must provide coherence for each historical case of Iranian 
foreign policy. 
3. If one or more theories meet the first two criteria, the simplest explanation 
is preferred. 
The following chapters describe in detail the four historical examples and 
examine each example according to the five international relations theories selected for 
testing.  Critical application of the criteria outlined above determine which theory best 
describes the historical case.  No attempt will be made to quantify the results, as the 
answer to the first question is binary, the second answer is qualitative, and the third 
guides selection where any particular theory relies on an excessive number of 
assumptions. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The wide body of literature examining Iranian foreign policy from 1979 to 2009 
resorts to a variety of theories of international relations to explain the reasons for Iranian 
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state action.  The fact that most of this literature is internally consistent should not come 
as a surprise.  Social science, like the physical sciences, allows for a variety of internally 
consistent systematic explanations that lead to the same conclusion.2  Unlike the physical 
sciences, however, there are rarely experiments that one can conduct in order to falsify 
the development of international relations theory.  The historical record, therefore, is 
scoured for “outlier” examples that seem to defy expectations in search of some bit of 
evidence that might signal the end of one theory or other.  The Islamic Republic has, 
since its revolutionary inception, been regarded as such an outlier, and explanations 
regarding it are hotly debated. 
Similar to the lead-up to the war with Iraq, influential policy advisors and national 
security experts promoted the notion that Iranian state actions can only be understood in 
the context of either religious ideology or as the result of complex factional in-fighting 
between rival interests.3  The implication of the neo-conservative brand of liberal 
international relations theory, that peace can only be achieved when all states transition to 
democracies, naturally makes the case for policies advocating regime change in Iran.  
Liberal advocates of democratic peace theory, as well as theorists subscribing to 
ideological and factional explanations for Iranian foreign policy, claim Iran’s internal 
states of affairs are the causal mechanisms by which Iranian foreign policy is constructed.  
Said Arjomand ascribes Tehran’s expansionist policies to the rise of Ahmadinedjad and 
the Pasdaran.4  Explicitly advocating the view that Iran’s current foreign policy is tied to 
the internal regime politics, he claims that the split of the revolutionary political elite into 
hardliners and pragmatists, and the subsequent rise of the hardliners to power, drives both 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions and increased regional mischief.5  Several studies of Iranian 
factionalism cite these as reasons for understanding the internal workings of Iran’s 
foreign policy decision-making process.  Specifically, the Department of Defense funded 
                                                 
2 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970). 
3  Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk, Suzanne Maloney, Michael E. O'Hanlon and 
Bruce Riedel, Which Path to Persia (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 2009). 
4  Said Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
5 Ibid., 13 
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one such study by RAND which states in its preface, “. . . the U.S. ability to “read” the 
regime in Tehran and formulate appropriate policies has been handicapped by the lack of 
access to Iran. . .  The objective of this book is to offer a framework to help U.S. 
policymakers and analysts better understand existing and evolving leadership dynamics 
driving Iranian decision making.”6   
From a realist perspective, the development of closer regional ties insulates Iran 
against threats from potential hostile regional coalitions.  Further, security is advanced 
through the pursuit of popular programs that defy the international community, such as 
the nuclear program, support for Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as intra-regional 
economic and political engagement.  Iran’s state actions are firmly bound by selfish 
national interest in achieving security through regional hegemony, and are rational in 
accordance with a strict realist perspective, rendering appeals to the unique nature of 
Iran’s internal politics to explain state behavior of limited use. 
Realist explanations of Iranian foreign policy do not entirely discount the 
importance of internal politics, however.  Trita Parsi’s account of U.S., Israeli, and 
Iranian relations from 1979 through the first half of the present decade locates the foreign 
policies of each state within both an inter and intra-state context.7  Oliver Roy claims 
unambiguously that, “There is no fundamental disagreement within the Iranian political 
establishment over Iran’s ambition to be a major power, its need to have a nuclear 
capability, or over its ambition to weaken the Arab front.  The argument is over the 
means.”8  The internal argument from this point of view is hardly irrelevant, while the 
overall direction of Iranian foreign policy is accounted for in a realist framework.   
Analysis of internal ideological or factional explanations reveals a lack of light 
between ideological, factional, and hard-nosed realpolitik explanations for state actions.  
A number of authors refer to religious ideology as a mask of some sort for practical 
political motivations.  Despite the attempts of Iran’s clergy to claim the primacy of Islam 
                                                 
6  David E. Thaler, Alireza Nader, Shahram Chubin, Jerrold D. Green, Charlotte Lynch and Frederic 
Wehrey, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009). 
7  Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
8  Oliver Roy, The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East, trans. Ros Schwartz (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008). 
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over politics, it is clear that politics trumps religion in Iran’s foreign policy.  Ray Takeyh 
notes as much with respect to Iran’s pursuit of “un-Islamic” nuclear weapons, though 
ultimately Takeyh claims that Iran’s foreign policy is driven more by ideology than 
“rational calculation.”9  Oliver Roy’s contention that there is little disagreement over the 
content of Iranian foreign policy (see above quotation) among the various regime factions 
reinforces similar views expressed by Parsi.  Despite his claims tying expansionism to the 
rise of Ahmadinedjad; Arjomand states that Iran’s international politics have been 
remarkably consistent.10  Similar to Roy’s position, he contends that Iranian foreign 
policy has not changed so much as the means by which it is executed.11 
Factional and ideological explanations for Iran’s support to Hamas and Hezbollah 
abound.  In his study of Hezbollah, Richard Norton attributes ideological revolutionary 
motivation to Iran’s support of Hezbollah, while ascribing purely rational motivations of 
national self interest to Syria’s support of the same.12  Takeyh makes a similar claim, 
moderated by recognition of the fact that Syria and Iran both stood to gain from mutual 
alliance and support of Hezbollah.13  Kenneth Pollack maintains that Iran’s support for 
terrorism in the 1980s served both ideological and practical foreign policy objectives.14  
His claim is predicated on the assumption that Khomeini was the driver of Iran’s foreign 
policy, and had sufficient influence to, at times, trump genuine national interest in favor 
of ideological pursuits.  If this is the case, one would expect to see much less 
ideologically driven foreign policy in the post-Khomeini era.  In the absence of a 
carefully considered analysis of Iran’s foreign policy goals, however, factionalism filled 
the explanatory void left by Khomeini’s death.  A cottage industry of factionalist 
explanations for Iran’s foreign policy caters to proponents of democratic peace and 
neoconservatives.  Mehdi Moslem contrasts the rhetoric of Khatami and Khamenehi to 
                                                 
9  Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
10  Said Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under his successors (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 
11  Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 
12 Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007): 34–35. 
13 Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009): 71. 
14 Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House, 2004): 198. 
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illustrate the spectrum of ideological conflict being waged within Iran, and argues that 
Iran’s seemingly inconsistent policies are the result of ongoing internal power 
struggles.15  Similarly, Ehteshami and Zweiri explain Iran’s putative shift to a more 
strident foreign policy, actively fighting the U.S. and Israel by proxy with Hezbollah and 
Hamas, in terms of the rise of Iran’s neoconservatives.16  Ultimately, the policy 
prescriptions of advocates of ideological and factional explanations for Iran’s foreign 
policy lead to meddling in Iran’s internal affairs.  If these assumptions are incorrect and 
Iran’s motivations for supporting Hamas and Hezbollah, along with a host of other 
foreign policy decisions, have less to do with internal factionalism and lack of democracy 
than a pragmatic concern for bolstering their regional security, then these policy 
prescriptions may be dangerously misguided. 
Factional, ideological, and realist explanations for Iran’s pursuit of nuclear 
weapons technology seek to explain the same behavior, but their corresponding policy 
prescriptions are very different.  Within both factional and ideological explanations for 
Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear capability, there is an assumption that regime change would 
affect Iranian policy.  This notion is particularly appealing to neoconservatives and 
liberals sold on Kantian peace.  While the realities of the Iraq war may have muted calls 
for regime change in Iran, recent successes in both Iraq and Afghanistan and disclosures 
of Iran’s continued progress towards developing a weapons capability have reinvigorated 
neoconservative and liberal advocates of regime change. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis begins with the opening question of which international relations 
theory best explains each of the four historical examples, followed by a treatment of the 
existing literature, as detailed above.  Chapter I examines Iranian foreign policy during 
the Lebanese hostage crisis from the perspectives of each of the five cited international 
relations theories.  Chapter II covers Iranian support to Hezbollah.  Iran’s anti-Israel 
                                                 
15 Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 2002):  1–2. 
16 Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of Its Neoconservatives (New 
York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2007). 
 8
policy and rhetoric, to include its support to Hamas and alliance with Syria, is discussed 
in Chapter III, while Chapter IV concludes with a look at Iran’s nuclear development 
program.  The conclusion evaluates each of the five international relations theories 
according to their ability to coherently explain the historical cases, and makes a 
determination as to which best explains each, while being careful not to generalize as to 
any broader conclusions regarding international relations theory outside of the narrow 




II. LEBANON HOSTAGE CRISIS 
The Lebanon hostage crisis began in the early 1980s and lasted until 
approximately 1992.  The hostages, mostly Western European and American, were 
abducted mainly by Islamic Jihad, an organization closely affiliated with Lebanese 
Hezbollah.  Lebanese Hezbollah itself was subordinate to Iran, its principal benefactor 
(along with Syria).  Iran coordinated with Lebanese Hezbollah through the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the IRGC’s Office of Liberation Movements. 
The first Western hostages were apparently taken in retaliation for the actions of 
Lebanese Christian militia forces, but subsequent hostage-taking served a number of 
purposes, from quid pro quo prisoner exchanges to demands for changes to U.S. foreign 
policy.  Significantly, the most tangible result of U.S. hostage-taking was the sale of U.S. 
arms to Iran, critically needed by the Iranian government in its decade-long war with 
Iraq. 
Explanations for Iran’s hostage policy draw on its need for regional security, 
revolutionary ideological mission, internal factionalist squabbles, long-standing cultural 
ties with Lebanon, and iterative processes of negotiation between domestic imperatives 
and international relationships.  The historical facts of the crisis clearly demonstrate that 
the majority of these explanations are not coherent.  Iran abandons its rational security 
interests as a result of factionalist infighting.  In favor of its security interest, Iran 
consistently eschews its ideology as well as its cultural ties to Lebanon.  Factionalist 
rivalries and two-level game theory turn out to be the only explanations that satisfy the 
requirements of falsifiability, coherence, and simplicity. 
A. HISTORY OF THE CRISIS 
 The Lebanon Hostage Crisis, sometimes referred to as the Western Hostage 
Crisis, did not originate with the abduction of Western hostages.  The crisis began with 
the abduction of four politically important Iranians by Christian militiamen in Beruit 
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during the summer of 1982.17  The four stopped by Lebanese Forces militia included: 
Sayyed Mohsen Musavi, Iran’s chargé d’affaires to Lebanon; Ahmad Motevasselian, the 
commander of the IRGC contingent at Ba’albek; Kazem Akhavan, a photographer for the 
IRNA;  and their driver, Taqi Rastegar Moqddam, a dual citizen of Lebanon and Iran.  
According to Samir Geagea in 1990, the Lebanese Forces commander, Elie Hobeika 
ordered their execution “within hours of their arrival.”18  The government of Iran 
disputes this account, claiming that all or some of the Iranians continue to be held in 
Israeli prisons. 
In swift response, Iranian proxies abducted David Dodge, the president of the 
American University in Beirut (AUB) on 19 July.  Taken to the IRGC headquarters at 
Ba’albek, Dodges’ incarceration continued in Iran until the Syrian government intervened 
to secure his release the following year, on 21 July 1983.19  Despite the obvious 
connection between the abduction of the four Iranians by Lebanese Forces, widely 
viewed as proxies of Israel and the U.S., and the abduction of David Dodge;  no demands 
or justifications were communicated to the U.S. government regarding his detention, 
underscoring the communications difficulties that plagued kidnapping operations in 
Lebanon throughout the 1980s.  The fact that an immediate response for the abduction of 
the Iranians was politically required, combined with the relatively new IRGC force 
structure that was still building up in Lebanon, provides a likely explanation for both the 
poor communication regarding the purpose of taking David Dodge hostage, as well as the 
poor operational security that led to the U.S. discovery that he was taken to Tehran and 
incarcerated at the Evin prison.  Regardless, upon his release, kidnapping operations 
would not resume until early 1984 with the abduction of Hussein Farrash, and the 
assassination of Malcolm Kerr. 
The resumption of kidnapping operations in 1984 is frequently attributed to the 
trial and imprisonment of the “Dawa 17” in Kuwait.  The trial and conviction of the Iraqi 
al-Dawa al-Islamiyyah members for multiple bombing attacks against Kuwaiti, French, 
                                                 
17 Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle (New York: Random House, 2004): 209. 
18  Ihsan A. Hijazi, "Hostages' Fate Linked to 4 Missing Iranians," New York Times, Nov 23, 1990: 11. 
19 Bernard Gwertzman, "American is Freed with Help of Syria," New York Times, July 22, 1983: 1. 
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and American targets in Kuwait led to demands from Lebanese Hezbollah for their 
release in exchange for hostages.  The attacks took place in December of 1983, and in 
March 1984, Hezbollah (through its thinly-veiled proxy, Islamic Jihad) responded by 
taking Frank Regier, Christian Joubert, Jeremy Levin, and William Buckley hostage.  
Additionally, Malcolm Kerr, the new president of AUB was assassinated in January 
(probably in a failed kidnapping attempt), though no claims of responsibility were made 
for his assassination. 
Besides the Iranian links between the Dawa 17 and Lebanese Hezbollah, there 
were also familial ties to be considered.  Husayn al-Musawi, the leader of Islamic Amal, 
and Imad Mughniyah, the leader of Islamic Jihad who would go on to become the most 
notorious and effective Hezbollah operative in the 1980s, were relatives of two of the 
Dawa 17.  Thus, multiple interests converged: Iran’s desire to punish U.S., French, and 
Kuwaiti support to Iraq: Hezbollah’s desire to punish U.S. and French support for the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon: and their mutual interest in freeing the Dawa 17 for 
supporting both those efforts. 
After sentencing of the Dawa 17 in Kuwait in March 1984, Iran and Hezbollah 
upped the international pressure on Kuwait and their handling of the prisoners by 
kidnapping a British hostage.20  Peter Kilburn was kidnapped on 3 December 1984, likely 
in coordination with the hijacking of Kuwait Airlines Flight 221 the following day by 
Dawa members demanding release of their members.21  Following Kilburn, American, 
Lawrence Jenco, was abducted in January of 1985, and Eric Wehrli, the Swiss chargé 
d’affaires, was apparently abducted on the mistaken assumption that he was French.22 
The stated reasons for hostages taken from 1985 on began to focus on the plight 
of prisoners held in Israeli camps and Western support for Israel, as well as specific cases 
of prisoners held in Germany and France.  The withdrawal of the IDF from Southern 
Lebanon between February and June of 1985 represented a victory for Hezbollah (as did 
the earlier withdrawal of the Multinational Forces); through the use of classical guerrilla 
                                                 
20  Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb'aallah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York, 
NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997): 92. 
21  Ibid., 93.   
22  Ibid. 
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warfare operations, it had worn down the far superior IDF by breaking the political will 
of Israel to remain committed to the fight in Lebanon.  By early 1985, over 90 percent of 
the Israeli population approved of the planned withdrawal.23  These two victories 
demonstrated the importance of Hezbollah as an organization and vindicated Tehran’s 
policies at home at a time when a foreign policy victory was desperately needed. 
Pressing their advantage, in early 1985 Islamic Jihad abducted Marcel Fontaine, 
Marcel Carton, Lawrence Jenco and Terry Anderson, and continued demands for the 
release of the Dawa 17.24  This was followed in May and June by the kidnappings of 
Jean-Paul Kaufmann, Michel Seurat, David Jacobsen and Thomas Sutherland, also by 
Islamic Jihad, and the hijacking of TWA Flight 847.25 The Israeli withdrawal in June and 
the subsequent demand for the release of 766 Lebanese prisoners in Israel by the 
hijackers re-established the link between the hostages and Lebanese-specific interests.  
The ongoing demand for the release of the Dawa 17, however, underscored the potential 
for Iranian influence as the hostage crisis entered a new phase with the Iran-Contra 
Scandal. 
Acquiescing to the demands of the hijackers, the U.S. pressured Israel to release 
the 766 prisoners in exchange for the passengers on board Flight 847.  In a quid pro quo, 
Iran’s speaker of parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani pressured Hezbollah to 
release the airline hostages.26  This was but one of many concessions the Reagan 
administration made in response to Hezbollah and Iran, a process that began with the 
U.S. troop withdrawal from Lebanon.  Meanwhile, concern over the plight of the 
hostages in Lebanon by President Reagan ultimately led to the effort by the U.S. 
administration to exchange arms in order to secure their release.27  Unwilling or unable to 
influence the government of Kuwait over the fate of the Dawa 17, and presented with the 
possibility of improved relations with Iran and the release of the hostages by Israeli 
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intermediaries, the U.S. began swapping U.S. arms for the promise of Iranian influence to 
release U.S. hostages in Lebanon.  The results of the effort were less than stellar. 
The interests of the U.S., Israel, and Iran converged briefly in the mid 1980s, 
giving rise to what would become known in the U.S. as the Iran-Contra Scandal.  The 
story began with Operation Staunch, a U.S. initiative aimed at cutting Iran off from the 
international weapons market.  By 1985, Operation Staunch was beginning to have a 
major impact on Iran’s ability to procure weapons.28  To make matters worse, Iraqi 
offensives against Iranian population centers were increasingly effective.  This created a 
need for Iran to somehow break the U.S. stranglehold.  Breaking with his previous policy 
of “neither east nor west”; Khomeini’s “open window” policy emerged, and his point-
man to spearhead efforts to open up the international weapons market was the Speaker of 
Parliament, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani.29 
Rafsanjani’s initial efforts to acquire weapons from the U.S. failed.  Using a series 
of intermediaries, terminating with the Iranian arms dealer Manouchehr Ghorbanifarr, 
Rafsanjani managed to secure a deal with the U.S. government to exchange weapons for 
Iranian influence to release U.S. hostages held in Lebanon.30  The story of the Iran-
Contra affair is well documented on the side of the U.S., but given the lack of 
transparency of the Iranian regime, considerably less is know about how, exactly, 
Khomeini’s “open window” policy led to the arms-for-hostages exchanges, which 
governmental institutions were involved, and whether or not the factional disputes that 
arose from the crisis led to one of the Islamic Republic’s biggest rifts.   
A number of intermediaries had to be used by the government of Iran before 
successful communications with the U.S. could be established.  Initial gestures of 
goodwill were rebuffed—the interventions of Rafsanjani and the Iranian Foreign 
Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati on behalf of the hostages aboard Flight 847 did little 
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towards establishing initial contacts with the U.S. administration.31  Nonetheless, it did 
demonstrate the potential of Iranian cooperation in dealing with Hezbollah. 
The efforts of the government of Iran to open channels with the U.S. most likely 
began with Khomeini himself, and involved House Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Mir-
Hossein Musavi, Hassan Karrubi (the brother of Mehdi Karrubi), Khomeini’s deputy, 
Montazeri and his protégé, Mehdi Hashemi.32  This constitutes a list of Iranian clerical 
political operatives known to be involved in the arms-for-hostages scandal, and is not 
comprehensive.  It is important to note, however, that in order to effect the exchanges of 
arms for hostages, the Iranian government  involved politicians from multiple factions.  
Rafsanjani, Khomeini’s pragmatist agent, drove the Iranian initiative.  . By virtue of their 
positions in government and relationships with Hezbollah: Musavi, Montazeri, and 
Hashemi, all had to be involved from various leftist factions. 
The principal agent working to establish a communications channel with the U.S. 
government was the Iranian arms dealer, Manuchehr Ghorbanifar.  Following several 
failed attempts at engaging the U.S., Ghorbanifar was advised by fellow arms dealer 
Adnan Kashogi to use Israeli intermediaries.33  By 1985, Ghorbanifar was actively 
working with Israeli politicians, lawmakers, and arms dealers in an effort to draw the 
U.S. into a weapons agreement with the Islamic Republic.  Meanwhile, in the U.S., 
concerns over Soviet influence in Iran caused President Reagan to request that his 
security staff investigate means by which the U.S. could re-engage Iran in order to off-set 
Soviet influence.34  Though Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane later 
stated “. . .that theory [the theory of Soviet influence] was created among ourselves and 
had no foundation in fact or contemporary events or intelligence material,” it would be 
exceedingly surprising if it was supposed without evidence, which was so readily  
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available.35  Khomeini’s new foreign policy of 1985, resulting in Rafsanjani’s efforts to 
break Operation Staunch and improve relations with the Soviet Union were hardly state 
secrets.36 
As a result of Khomeini’s “open window” policy, Iran renewed ties with the 
Soviet Union.  Throughout 1985, Iran aggressively sought renewed ties with the Soviet 
Union, using oil and gas deliveries as levers by which to influence Soviet policy (with the 
implicit goal of influencing Soviet support for Iraq), and signaling the possibility of a 
softening stance regarding Iranian expectations for the outcome of the Iran-Iraq War.37  
Though this line of negotiation would eventually be sabotaged by the kidnapping of the 
Syrian charge d’affaires, the revelation of the arms-for-hostages scandal, and political 
infighting in the Iranian government; the fact that there was a preponderance of evidence 
for Iran-Soviet rapprochement casts doubt on McFarlane’s recollection that there was no 
evidence to support U.S. fears that the Soviets were better positioned to “exploit or 
benefit from any power struggle” in Iran.38   
Recollections aside, by early 1985 the U.S. administration convinced itself that it 
had to identify a means by which it could exert leverage with Iran.  Charged by Reagan 
with coming up with a solution to the problem, Michael Ledeen met Shimon Peres on 6 
May 1985.39  Ledeen’s follow-on meeting with McFarlane, combined with a new CIA 
SNIE, led to the development of the 1985 draft NSDD, U.S. Policy toward Iran, in which 
McFarlane recommended, among other things, “. . . to help Iran meet its import 
requirements. . .  This includes provision of selected military equipment as determined on 
a case-by-case basis.”40  This would eventually result in the provision of the provision of 
a first shipment of TOW missiles to Tehran from Israel in August of 1985.  Though no  
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hostages were released as a result of the initial shipment, the second shipment was sent as 
promised in September, and the first of the quid pro quo hostages, Benjamin Weir, 
released.41   
The next major shipment of arms took place on 24 November of 1985, the result 
of meetings between: Ledeen, Schwimmer, Nimrodi, Kimche, Ghorbanifar, and Hassan 
Karroubi, brother of Mehdi Karroubi, and supposedly a member of Khomeini’s cabinet.42  
The shipment was of 18 HAWK missiles, all of which were to be sent from Israel, for the 
purpose of improving Tehran’s static air defenses against Iraqi high-altitude aircraft.  The 
Iranian army retained officers possessing experience with the HAWK missile system, and 
were evidently aware of the existence of the I-HAWK program at the time of their 
request.43  When the legacy HAWK missile system was sent from Israel to Iran, and the 
Iranians discovered that they were not sent what was expected, they were reportedly 
furious.44  In his testimony to congress in 1987, Lt. Col. Oliver North stated that “the 
Iranians were saying amongst themselves that the U.S. was ‘cheating on them’ is the 
word that was used frequently in the sensitive intelligence.”45  Assuming the “special 
intelligence” reporting of the Iranian reaction was accurate, it is apparent that the original 
request for the I HAWK missile system was, in fact, on behalf of the government of Iran, 
and that any deception or miscommunication was on the part not of the Iranians, but 
either the U.S. or Israel, or both.  Since the Israelis did not have I HAWKs at that time, 
and since the U.S. negotiator, Ledeen, was not familiar with the HAWK air defense 
system, it is likely that the miscommunication was, at the very least, the result of 
ignorance on behalf of the U.S., and possibly the Israelis as well.  Attempting to mitigate 
the potential for risking the lives of the hostages, the U.S. attempted to cut out Israel as 
the middle-man by establishing a “second channel” to the Iranian government. 
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The release of Benjamin Weir, and the subsequent releases of Lawrence Jenco 
and David Jacobsen were offset by the kidnappings of Frank Reed, Joseph Ciccipio, and 
Ed Tracy.  The travel of a joint U.S. and Israeli delegation to Tehran would result in the 
establishment of a “second channel” going around the Iranian arms dealer Ghorbanifar, 
but would also provide the necessary publicity to shut down the entire operation.  Covert 
arms deliveries from the U.S., the leverage of hostages, and rapprochement with the U.S. 
and, potentially, Israel, would all be lost as a result of making the trilateral relationship 
public through the disclosure of the Tehran trip to a Lebanese news agency.  Various 
factions within each country stood to gain from such a disclosure; but the blame for 
disclosure appears to fall on a faction allied with Ayatollah Montazeri who, at the time, 
was increasingly critical of Khomeini even though he was the heir apparent as the next 
supreme leader. 
Though there is little information available from the Iranian side regarding the 
identity of the principals,  and their motivations and expectations; much can be gleaned 
through the examination of the extensive records of testimony and documentation 
released as a result of the Walsh investigation.  It is apparent through multiple sources 
that there were multiple factions in Iran, and the U.S. government was not only aware of 
the internal factionalism at the time, but considered such factionalism  an existential 
threat to the Khomeini regime.46  Combining declassified U.S. intelligence reporting with 
historical accounts of post-revolutionary Iran under Khomeini, one can piece together a 
picture of the Iranian government’s role and perspective in the arms-for-hostages scandal. 
Factionalist infighting manifested itself in a direct challenge from Majles (Iranian 
Parliament) conservatives to Khomeini in 1985 during the confirmation of Prime 
Minister Musavi.  Despite eventually gaining the approval of the Majles, he faced 
staunch opposition to his cabinet nominees.47  Further, once approved, Musavi’s 
perennial political rival, Khameini, attempted to remove Musavi as Prime Minister with 
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the support of the factionalist allies of Ayatollah Azeri-Qomi.48  According to CIA 
reporting earlier that year, Qomi began a campaign against the selection of Montazeri as 
the next Supreme Leader, and Qomi and Ayatollah Khoi both took public positions 
opposing Khomeini’s continued prosecution of the Iran-Iraq War, calling it “un-
Islamic.”49  By the end of 1985, according to Moslem, “factional conflict was reaching 
dangerous levels” requiring Khomeini’s direct and public intervention; the following 
year, however, the infighting would overflow into Iran’s foreign policy arena. 
Thus, at least three different factions with different domestic and foreign policy 
agendas were engaged in a power struggle within the Iranian political establishment.  
These factions are variously identified as liberals, moderates, and conservatives, though 
these shorthand identifications translate poorly when applied to Iran in the era of 
Khomeini.  The liberals were strong supporters of the export of the revolution, Hezbollah, 
and the position of maintaining hostages as leverage against the U.S. and Western 
European countries.  The conservatives, represented by Azeri-Qomi, were against both 
the export of the revolution and the taking of hostages, and by 1985 had come out 
strongly against the war with Iraq, as noted above.  The moderates, represented by 
Rafsanjani and Khameini, consistently sought engagement with the West, to include the 
U.S., as a means by which to address Iran’s foreign and domestic policy problems.  When 
Rafsanjani used proxies to seek out a means by which to engage the U.S. in order to buy 
weapons in exchange for hostages, he did so with the approval of Khomeini and the 
knowledge, if not the agreement of, Prime Minister Musavi.50  It was under the authority 
and with the cooperation of Ayatollah Montazeri and his protégé, Mehdi Hashemi that 
the Iranian side of the arms-for-hostages scandal was executed. 
Mehdi Hashemi, as the leader of the Office of Islamic Liberation Movements was 
in a unique position to both formulate and execute foreign policy for the Islamic 
Republic, particularly as it related to Lebanon.  Overstepping his bounds, however, he 
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attempted to discredit his political opponents by leaking information on the American 
delegation’s trip to Tehran.51  As the leader of the Office of Islamic Libration Movements, 
he was in a unique position of power with respect to Hezbollah, and deeply involved in 
Iranian oversight of Hezbollah’s operations, specifically with respect to hostage-taking 
operations.  Formally under the auspices of the IRGC, Hashemi in fact was accountable 
to Ayatollah Montazeri, and his office was largely autonomous.  This turned out to be a 
double-edged sword.  Autonomy gave him freedom to accomplish his mission with little 
outside interference, but also caused him to be and outsider with respect to the mechanics 
of the decision-making processes within the political hierarchy.  Thus, his attempts at 
political maneuvering backfired when, in an effort to discredit Rafsanjani, he 
inadvertently took on Khomeini instead. 
While the arms-for-hostages scandal is generally dismissed as a case in which the 
Iranians, locked on their desire for arms, failed to “think big” with respect to broader 
engagement with the U.S., it is not possible to make that determination based on the 
available historical evidence.52  Khomeini’s “open window” policy certainly held out the 
hope of broader engagement.  Rafsanjani, throughout the 1980s, sought engagement with 
the U.S. as well.  The pace at which the Iranian political establishment moved may not 
have been sufficient to see any progress on rapprochement, but there were certainly 
indications of forward progress.  Despite the fact that three more hostages were taken for 
the three released, the likelihood that internal power struggles accounted for the 
additional hostage-taking was obvious, given the tenor of CIA reporting at the time.  The 
leaking of McFarlane’s visit to Tehran that led to the compromise of secret negotiations 
between Iran and the U.S. collapsed all hopes of rapprochement.  The disclosure was 
clearly the result of a factional struggle between Rafsanjani’s burgeoning modernist 
conservatives and the Islamic left of Montazeri and Musavi, but factionalism does not 
account for the whole of Iran’s hostage policy agenda. 
                                                 
51  John W. Limbert, Negotiating with Iran (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2009): 
136n.  Summary of Abrahamian, Tortured Confessions, 162–163.  Abrahamian claims that Mehdi Hashemi 
was executed for leaking the McFarlane visit to he Lebanese weekly, Al-Shiraa. 
52  Ibid., 138. 
 20
B. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Realist, ideological, factional, constructivist, and two-level game theory 
explanations for the Lebanese Hostage Crisis are not equally satisfactory.  Factional and 
two-level game theory explanations are internally coherent.  Realist and ideological 
explanations do not line up neatly with the historical evidence, and the preponderance of 
evidence lines up against constructivist arguments.  In the competition for which theory 
best explains Iran’s foreign policy, therefore, factionalist and two-level game theoretic 
explanations are each satisfactory for this historical example. 
The realist explanation of the Hostage Crisis addresses Iran’s asymmetric 
approach to balance regional threats—specifically, Iraq and the U.S.  By taking Western 
hostages using a proxy, Iran was able to defeat the MNF, of which the U.S. was a part, 
while maintaining plausible deniability of its involvement.  Further, it was able to use its 
influence over Hezbollah as a means by which to broker arms-for-hostages deals with the 
U.S., as well as gain concessions from France and Germany.  The weapons deals with the 
U.S. proved to be critical in off-setting superior Iraqi armor and air assets during Iran’s 
southern offensives in 1987. 
 The realist explanation does not, however, address Iran’s motivations for 
exposing the arms-for-hostages scandal, nor does it explain, if the goal was gaining 
access to U.S. weapons in order to defeat the existential threat of Iraq, why Iran did not 
take advantage of the McFarlane visit in order to establish a new rapprochement with the 
U.S.  Iran did try to continue the arms-for-hostages swaps after the exposure of the 
scandal, reflecting a strong realist strain within the government.  The elements of the 
government that successfully sought to sabotage that effort, however, lead one away from 
realism as a practical explanatory model. 
 Ideological explanations for the Hostage Crisis address the motivations of forcing 
the withdrawal of the MNF and gaining concessions (arms-for-hostages) in order to fight 
Iraq.  Each case, in some way, meets an ideological objective.  The expulsion of the MNF 
from Lebanon meets the ideological goal of spreading the revolution, while the arms-for-
hostages meets the goal of gaining weapons in order to fight Iraq.  The weapons 
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concessions, however, are problematic, in that they involved gaining weapons through 
Israel in order to fight Iraq.  This was difficult, at the very least, to justify ideologically.  
Rafsanjani himself claimed that no weapons came from Israel, and if they did, they would 
not be used.53  Not only was this not the case for the arms-for-hostages scandal, it did not 
begin to cover Iran’s direct secret arms deals with Israel from 1980 until Operation 
Staunch in 1983.  Ideological explanations of the Hostage Crisis are, therefore, not 
satisfactory. 
 Factional explanations for the Hostage Crisis address the motivations behind the 
revelation of the scandal.  Radical leftists, internally factionalized, had operational 
control over Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon, as well as over the IRGC in Tehran.  The 
senior Iranian government representative directing all IRGC activities from Syria was Ali 
Akbar Mohtashamipur, through whom Rafsanjani had to go directly in order to 
communicate with Hezbollah.54  Subordinate to him, Mehdi Hashemi, supported by 
Ayatollah Montazeri (who would grow ideologically apart from Khomeini resulting in 
his dismissal in 1989), was responsible for the leak of the arms-for-hostages deals to the 
newspapers in 1986.  The leftist factions were ideologically opposed to the arms-for-
hostages deals, which they knew were facilitated by the Israelis.55  Thus, seeking to 
expose and halt the deals, while simultaneously embarrassing their political rivals;  the 
leftists severely overstepped their political boundaries, resulting in Hashemi’s execution, 
and putting Montazeri on the path towards political exile.  The pragmatic faction of the 
Iranian government, represented principally by Rafsanjani, was responsible for 
instigating the arms-for-hostages deals at the behest of Khomeini, which explains both 
why the senior leftists went along with the program for so long, and the need for extreme 
secrecy, which was eventually violated by one of their own.  Factional explanations, in 
the end, provide a relatively comprehensive explanation for the Lebanese Hostage Crisis. 
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 Constructivism fails to address the hostage crisis in any meaningful way.  Cultural 
ties between Lebanon and Iran and the common ideological mandate to continue the 
Islamic revolution provides an excellent explanation for Iran’s involvement in Lebanon, 
but fails when hostage taking—presumably serving the ideological purpose of convincing 
foreign governments to get out of Lebanon—is used instead to serve Iran’s interest in 
weapons procurement.  The actions of the government of Iran, as they pertain to the 
hostage crisis, demonstrate a willingness to discard religious and cultural values in the 
pursuit of their national interest. 
 Two-level game theory provides a reasonable explanation for the hostage crisis by 
combining a factionalist explanation with a realist explanation, each of which is 
addressed in detail, above.  The combination of the two results in a realist foreign policy 
agenda bound by the realities of internal political struggle.  This accurately describes the 
Iranian government’s approach to the Hostage Crisis, particularly given the government’s 
desire to continue with the exchanges despite their public revelation.  
The politics of the radical left naturally dominated revolutionary discourse 
through the early 1980s.  The Iraqi attack on the new regime galvanized this political 
radicalism, particularly among the armed forces, the IRGC, and Office of Liberation 
Movements, where radical leftist clergy dominated the leadership.  Trapped by an 
ideological discourse that was increasingly isolationist, and a war that was going badly, 
the leadership of the radical left—especially Khomeini—sought an ideologically 
justifiable alternative to continued isolation in order to salvage the war effort.  Hitting 
upon the “open window” policy, he designated the pragmatist Majles speaker as his 
ambassador to the world in order to attempt to gain access to international weapons 
markets. 
Rafsanjani’s approach to the issue was simple. The problem with the international 
weapons markets was that they were blocked by the U.S., which had enacted Operation 
Staunch in an effort to limit the supply of arms to Tehran.  The solution to Operation 
Staunch, therefore, was to go to the U.S. directly.  With Khomeini’s political cover 
against the radicals, Rafsanjani was able to leverage Iranian influence (through the leftist 
factions) with Hezbollah in order to entice the U.S. into making a weapons deal.  The 
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radical leftist factions of Montazeri and Musavi would cooperate, as they were insulated 
from the deals by Rafsanjani’s involvement, and it provided a solution to the very real 
wartime problem with Iraq. 
If the government of Iran wanted to keep U.S. involvement quiet, it was 
extremely sensitive about any public disclosure of Israeli involvement, as mentioned 
above.  When the first shipment of HAWK missiles arrived in Iran in 1986 with the star 
of David emblazoned on them, the Iranians demanded that they be returned.56  
Additionally, the missiles turned out to be the wrong kind—Iran had requested 
(improved) I-HAWK missiles, but the missiles they received were the older version.  
Oliver North in his congressional testimony stated that according to the special 
intelligence he received about the blunder, he became concerned for the lives of the 
hostages.57  The hostages were not executed, however, and Prime Minister Musavi 
suspected Rafsanjani’s contacts, who executed the deal, of foul play—not the U.S. and 
Israel.58  In reality, the foul-up on the type of weapon was probably the result of the fact 
that the negotiators on the U.S. side did not know anything about the missiles being 
requested, and the U.S. had not yet sold I-HAWK technology to the Israelis, who 
supplied Iran as an intermediary from their stockpile. 
Similar to Putnam’s model describing the Bonn Summit, in order for the arms-
for-hostages scandal to have occurred at all, both Iran and the U.S. needed to engage in 
some amount of ideological compromise.59  The U.S. compromised the policy of not 
making deals for hostages through a weak argument about Soviet influence in Iran.  The 
U.S. administration further allowed itself to be convinced by Iranian negotiators that 
short-term arms deals would lead to long-term rapprochement.  Iranian foreign policy on 
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the hostage issue was determined according to a series of interrelated decisions and 
events that worked against factionalist public ideology, but in favor of their private aims.  
Leftist factionalists allowed Khomeini and Rafsanjani to solve the problem of weapons 
procurement, and provided secret cooperation in the form of releasing hostages, and 
accepting and verifying weapons deliveries.   
Had the leftist factions not sponsored Hezbollah’s taking of U.S. hostages to 
begin with, none of these deals would have been possible.  This prerequisite met, along 
with the need for weapons in order to continue to fight Iraq, it created an opportunity for 
the pragmatist faction to set up the arms deals.  The U.S. needed leverage in order to 
secure the release of the hostages, but could not simply exchange arms for hostages 
without some sort of political cover, however weak that might be.  Pragmatist assurances 
of internal dissent among the ruling clergy in Iran provided the necessary rationale, which 
had the added benefit of being true, according to both public accounts and secret CIA 
assessments.60  These interrelated events provided both Iran and the U.S. with the 
necessary pressures and justifications to move ahead with the arms-for-hostages deal, and 
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III. IRANIAN SUPPORT TO HEZBOLLAH 
The roots of Iran’s support to Hezbollah predate the founding of the organization.  
Allies of Ayatollah Khomeini trained with Shia paramilitary organizations sponsored by 
Syria in both Lebanon and Damascus in the 1970s.61  By the time of the Islamic 
Revolution, the cultural, religious, and ideological ties established between Iranian and 
Lebanese Shia clergy in Najaf were galvanized by Iranian support to Lebanese Shia 
organizations during Lebanon’s civil war, which began in 1975.  Forming Hezbollah as 
an umbrella organization for Shia political and paramilitary activity in 1982, Iran’s IRGC 
and Office of Islamic Liberation Movements paved the way for unprecedented levels of 
cooperation between Lebanese Shia paramilitaries and the new theocratic regime in Iran. 
Realist explanations for Iranian support to Hezbollah focus on Iran’s adoption of 
asymmetric military capabilities in order to bolster its security position.  Ideological and 
constructivist explanations address historical and ideological ties between the Shia of Iran 
and Lebanon, while factionalists use these ideological splits as a means for identifying 
underlying factional differences between rival groups vying for power in Iran.  Two-level 
game theory combines both factionalist and realist explanations as factors going into a 
negotiated process with Iran’s Hezbollah policy as its outcome. 
A. HISTORY 
The history of Shia ties between Iran and Lebanon goes back to the Safavid 
Dynasty, but the history of the radicalization of Shia politics that led to the formation of 
Hezbollah can be attributed to five key historical events of the 1970s and 80s.62  
According to Esposito, these key events were the civil war in Lebanon, the disappearance 
of Musa Sadr, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon, the revolution in Iran, and the 
disproportionate representation afforded the Shii of Southern Lebanon.  Sadr’s (likely) 
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death inflamed support for the Movement for the Deprived and Amal.  Israel’s invasion 
of Lebanon was initially welcomed by the Shia.  They would soon turn against Israel, 
however, as a result of continued occupation and heavy-handedness in dealing with the 
local population.  Iran’s successful Islamic revolution combined with the influx of 
radicalized clerics expelled from Najaf by Saddam Hussein, providing an “Islamic 
alternative” to nationalism and secularism. This, and the unrest of the civil war, created 
the ideal circumstances for Iran to experiment with the exportation of its revolution.63 
Esposito’s list leaves out at least two key historical events that worked to Iran’s 
advantage.  The first was the departure of the PLO from Lebanon, reinforcing the 
perception of the failure of Arab nationalism, and providing fertile ground for the use of 
Islam as the rallying ideology for combating imperialism.  The second event was the 
assassination of Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr in 1980.  The injustice of this action resonated 
with many Shia, increased support for Dawa, already popular among the clerics recently 
expelled from Iraq, and served as yet another symbol of the injustice represented by 
nationalists, in sharp contrast to the perception of the inherent justice and solidarity 
represented in and by the actions of Iran.          
Ignored, however, in this narrative is the fact that the alliance between Iran with 
the Lebanese Shia was facilitated by Asad’s Baath regime.  Asad had tried to establish an 
alliance with the Shah against Israel and Iraq in the mid 1970s.  Failing to accomplish his 
goals, he wisely reached out to the Iranian opposition with the assistance of Musa Sadr 
and by the late 1970s was providing training to opposition figures allied with Khomeini 
in the Bekaa Valley.64  Asad’s efforts paid off handsomely, as this Iranian leadership 
cadre returned to Lebanon to form Hebollah, while paying more than one million tons in 
oil per year to Syria for the privilege.65                                                                                                                
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Sending several hundred IRGC officers to Ba’albaak in Lebanon with the support 
of Syria, Iran launched an ambitious and wide-ranging program to transform the disparate 
Shia political groups within Lebanon into a unified paramilitary and political 
organization, capable of enforcing law and protecting the Shia population within its 
territory.  Taking on the enemy of imperialist oppression, the new organization sought the 
imposition of a new political order under the guidance of Sharia, and to expel imperialist 
aggressors, to include Israel and, later, the Multinational Forces under the auspices of the 
U.N. 
The initial deployment of 800 IRGC personnel to Lebanon took place in 1982 
under the supervision of Mohsen Rafiqdust.66  Rafiqdust, was one of the many senior 
IRGC commanders with previous experience in Lebanon.67 Mohsen Rezai, the Supreme 
Commander of the IRGC, also trained in Lebanon and Syria with the PLO and Amal.68  
The ties between the senior leadership in Iran and the radical movements in Lebanon 
were, in fact, deeply entrenched.  As the IRGC leadership had extensive ties to Lebanon, 
so did the clerical establishment in Lebanon possess extensive ties to the clerical 
leadership in Tehran via Najaf.  These ties would manifest themselves in a variety of 
ways throughout the 1980s and 1990s, perhaps most strikingly as the Islamic Republic 
navigated its own factionalist crisis.   
The IRGC, in the meantime, worked to establish its position in Lebanon.  Sending 
the bulk of its advisors initially to Ba’albek, IRGC forces then dispatched smaller 
elements throughout the rest of the Beka Valley, Beirut, and southern Lebanon.  
Avoiding direct confrontation, however, was a key factor for the IRGC.69  By avoiding 
direct combat in Lebanon, Iran could maintain deniability with respect to its use of 
Hezbollah as a proxy for Iranian-directed actions in Lebanon, particularly as Iranian and 
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Lebanese foreign policy objectives overlapped.  Military advisors provided training to 
indigenous combat forces, while Iranian clergy worked with local clergy to establish an 
Iranian vision of the Islamic Republic in those parts of Lebanon under Hezbollah’s 
control. 
The IRGC was ostensibly responsible for the activities of the Office of Liberation 
Movements, however in reality the office was largely autonomous.  As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Mehdi Hashemi was primarily accountable to Ayatollah Montazeri—a 
luxury that afforded him the ability to act decisively outside formal government channels, 
such as they were, but also insulating him from political realities of which he should have 
remained aware.  The period of 1982 to 1986, however, saw the Hashemi’s office, build 
up an unprecedented capability to conduct highly coordinated and completely deniable 
operations against Iran’s enemies using Hezbollah proxies. 
The mechanisms by which the IRGC conducted the operations that led to the 
departure of the U.N. Multinational Forces from Lebanon are not well understood, but 
several accounts have been offered from various sources.  Former CIA officer Rober 
Baer offers an account in which an IRGC officer by the name of Shaykh Hossein recruits 
Imad Mughniyah in 1982.70  According to this account, Shaykh Hossein recruits 
Mughniyah on the understanding that all communications would be handled face-to-face, 
and operational financing would likewise be handled in cash.  Baer’s account further 
states that the agreement specified that all operations would be explicitly approved by the 
IRGC and Iran’s Supreme Leader.71  The assumption that the activities of Imad 
Mughniyah’s Islamic Jihad were thinly veiled attempts at hiding Hezbollah—and 
Iran’s—involvement has come to be conventional wisdom.  If this account is correct, 
however, it offers some insight as to how directly and specifically the government of Iran 
was involved. 
Regardless of the mechanistic details, it is generally assumed that many of 
Hezbollah’s operations, particularly those executed under the name Islamic Jihad, were 
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specifically sanctioned by the government of Iran.  There is extensive evidence to support 
this claim.  First, there is Iran’s ability to influence ongoing operations conducted by 
either Islamic Jihad or other groups associated with Imad Mughniyah, such as the 
hijacking of TWA Flight 847.72  Both Rafsanjani and Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati 
ordered Iran’s Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur, to direct Hezbollah to 
end that hijacking operation.73  Next, there is evidence from the release of hostages 
during the course of the arms-for-hostages scandal.  Not only were at least some of the 
hostages released as a result of the U.S. arms deliveries, there is evidence from 
congressional testimony that the U.S. was collecting intelligence to confirm Iran’s 
intention to direct the release of the hostages (or, for that matter, direct their execution).74  
Last, there are these words, echoing those of the Islamic Republic: 
We, the sons of Hezbollah’s nation, whose vanguard God has given 
victory in Iran and which has established the nucleus of the world’s central 
Islamic state, abide by the orders of a single wise and just command 
currently embodied in the supreme Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-
Khomeini, the rightly guided imam who combines all the qualities of the 
total imam, who has detonated the Muslim’s revolution, and who is 
bringing about the glorious Islamic renaissance.75    
These words unambiguously declare the status of the government of Iran in Hezbollah’s 
institutional order.  Iran, however, despite such a declaration, could always maintain that 
while it has no operational control over Hezbollah, it may perhaps wield some influence. 
 The death of Khomeini, the revision of the Iranian constitution, and Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait, all affected Iranian foreign policy and its relationship with Hezbollah.  
Nonetheless, the core interests of both Hezbollah and Iran remained remarkably stable 
throughout this period of intense transition.  Rafsanjani, elected as Iran’s new president, 
                                                 
72  Robert Baer, The Devil We Know (New York: Crown, 2008): 79–80. 
73  Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007): 115.  Parsi states that 
Israeli intelligence intercepted communications between Rafsanjani and Mohtashamipur while the former 
was enroute from Tunisia. 
74  The Film Archive, "YouTube," Iran-Contra Hearings Day 23 Part 20: Oliver North Testimony 
Part 20, 1987, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zdeu5xqZgxQ (accessed July 5, 2010). 
75  Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shia (Austin: University of Texas, 1987): 168.  
Translation of an open letter from Hezbollah, 16 Feb, 1985. 
 30
brought his agenda of engagement as the means by which to revitalize Iran’s economy 
and rejoin the “world community.”  The selection of Khameini as Khomeini’s successor, 
and Rafsanjani’s ascendance to the new, constitutionally strengthened presidency, 
marginalized the leftist factions and would eventually lead to a complete reshuffling of 
Iran’s system of political alliances.  As the 1980s came to a close, however, Iran was still 
fighting a war with Iraq, the Dawa 17 were still held in Kuwait, and Hezbollah still held 
Western hostages in Lebanon. 
 The arms-for-hostages scandal led to the transfer of the Office of Liberation 
Movements from the IRGC to the Foreign Ministry.76  This allowed Rafsanjani to better 
control the direction given to Hezbollah by the government of Iran.  Subsequent to the 
move, Mehdi Hashemi was put to death.  Despite these changes, in the wake of the arms-
for-hostages scandal Hezbollah continued to take hostages, calling for the release of the 
Dawa 17 as well as Hezbollah operatives held in French and German prisons.  
Additionally, underscoring the importance of the Dawa 17, Hezbollah hijacked yet 
another airline seeking their release in 1988.  Further, the kidnapping of Jack Mann in 
response to the United Kingdom’s protection of Salmon Rushdie demonstrated that 
despite institutional moves to put Hezbollah under the control of the “pragmatist faction” 
of Rafsanjani, neither Hezbollah nor Iran had abandoned the ideology of the Islamic 
Revolution. 
The death of Khomeini and appointment of Khameini as the new Supreme Leader 
led to the 1989 constitutional revision.  Khameini had to contend with a far more 
powerful president in Rafsanjani as a result of the new constitution.  Allying with 
revolutionary hardliners provided him with legitimacy and allowed him to begin to grow 
a substantial political base independent of Rafsanjani.  To that end, Khameini sought to 
establish greater ties with “legitimate” revolutionary clerics as Rafsanjani restructured 
official government ties to Hezbollah.  Further, with the end of the civil war in Lebanon, 
and changes to the international security environment as it pertained to both Iran and 
Syria, it became clear that the role of Hezbollah, if not its very existence, was in question. 
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This supplied the context in which Hezbollah entered the 1990s.  The end of 
Lebanon’s Civil War and the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraq invasion of Kuwait, and the 
subsequent release of the Dawa 17 rendered hostage taking and terrorism against Western 
targets in Lebanon moot.  The cost of such operations was no longer commensurate with 
the perceived benefit.  The principals—Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah—therefore agreed on a 
plan for releasing the remaining hostages, and transitioning Hezbollah into a more 
recognizably political organization focused on Israeli resistance.77   
The assassination of Hezbollah’s newly elected Secretary General, Abbas al-
Musawi, in 1992 by Israel led to retaliation by Hezbollah, and the election of Hassan 
Nasrallah as the new Secretary General.78  Both Hezbollah’s retaliatory attack and 
Nasrallah’s close ties to the former Iranian Ambassador to Syria, Mohtashamipur, were 
no doubt unintended and unwelcome consequences of the assassination.  The ironic 
result, however, was to undermine Rafsanjani’s painstaking attempts to bring Hezbollah 
under the control of pragmatic elements of the Iranian government. Instead, the election 
of Nasrallah inadvertently reestablished the same line of communication Rafsanjani and 
Khomeini eliminated in 1986. 
Thus, even though Hezbollah successfully participated in the 1992 elections, 
marking a new era of participatory politics with the blessing of Iran, Hezbollah 
maintained its unconventional paramilitary capabilities and did not shy away from using 
them—such as in retaliation for Musawi’s assassination.  Maintaining Hezbollah, 
therefore, proved advantageous to Iran for a variety of reasons.  It provided a deniable, 
world-wide paramilitary capability, friendly territorial access to a key strategic region, 
acted as a respectable, legitimate, political force in an Arab country, and, in 1991, 
provided a means by which Iran could establish ties with the most important up-and-
coming Palestinian resistance movement—Hamas. 
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Iran’s anti-Israel policy was, in part, what led it to maintain ties with Hezbollah.  
Furthering that agenda, following the first intifada, Israel expelled 415 Hamas members 
to Lebanon, where Hezbollah was standing by to receive them as brothers-in-arms.79  
Taking advantage of the opportunity to establish extensive ties with Hamas, Iran offered 
weapons, training, and money.  By 1999, the Iranian Foreign Minister stated publicly 
that, “Iran is the main supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah in their struggle against 
Israel.”80 
B. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
 Realist, ideological, factional, constructivist, and two-level game theory 
explanations for Iran’s support to Hezbollah each successfully address aspects of Iran’s 
foreign policy.  Realist explanations deal with Iran’s effort to bolster its regional position 
by expelling regional threats and gaining a strategic foothold against Israel in Lebanon.  
Ideological explanations address Iran’s commitment to Islamic solidarity and the spread 
of the revolution.  Factionalist explanations address anomalies relating to internal 
political disputes between pragmatic and leftist elements within the clerical hierarchy.  
Constructivist explanations similarly address the historical ties between the clergy of Iran 
and Lebanon and take into account unifying factors of shared cultural and religious 
identity.  Two-level game theory explains Iranian support to Hezbollah as a complex 
iterative process in which multiple explanatory factors play a part at both domestic and 
international levels.  Each explanation has explanatory strengths, but they also have 
weaknesses, and in the end, two-level game theory is the only one with the flexibility to 
accommodate all of Iran’s disparate positions with respect to their support for Hezbollah. 
 Realist explanations of Iran’s support to Hezbollah focus on Iran’s intention to 
export its revolution; thereby strategically extending its influence in the direction of 
Iran’s only regional peer, Israe. .  Further, a cursory analysis of demographic trends 
illustrates that long-term alliance with Israel is less likely to ensure Iran’s security than 
                                                 
79  Robert Baer, The Devil We Know (New York: Crown, 2008): 172. 
80 Quoted from:  Ray Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009): 174. 
 33
multiple alliances with Arab states.  Iran cleverly redefined the basis for regional 
alliances in terms of religion (as opposed to ethnicity) and set about demonstrating the 
effectiveness of an “Islamic” alliance against Israel and “imperialist” forces.  Hezbollah, 
therefore, not only served the function of establishing a strategic ally on Israel’s northern 
border but provided a template to follow with other Arab states. 
 Ideological explanations account for Iran’s decision to send IRGC elements and 
clerical ambassadors to Lebanon in an effort to export the revolution, fight Israel, and 
expel the MNF.  The transition of Hezbollah to politics and social welfare, in addition to 
their traditional paramilitary role, in the 1990s, however, begins to detract from strict 
ideological explanations for Iran’s support to Hezbollah.  If the goal of Hezbollah was the 
export of the revolution and the establishment of an Islamic state mirroring that of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, then Hezbollah’s participation in Lebanon’s confessional 
system of government was an abandonment of that cause.  Ideological explanations of 
Iran’s support to Hezbollah, therefore, ultimately fall flat. 
 Factional explanations for Iran’s support to Hezbollah account for both the 
immediate support of the radical left.  Such explanations also account for the nature of 
Iranian support to Lebanon from the early 1980s.  Extensive contact with radical leftist 
clerics in the 1970s in both Iraq and Lebanon led to relations that were disproportionately 
balanced towards paramilitary organizations.  As the leftist clerics with experience and 
training in Lebanon found post-revolutionary political roles in the IRGC and the Office 
of Liberation Movements, those organizations became disproportionately well 
represented in Lebanon.  By the 1990s, the ascendance of the pragmatist faction of 
Rafsanjani ushered in a new era of realism, paving the way for acceptance of Hezbollah’s 
participation in Lebanon’s confessional political system.  Thus, factional explanations fit 
the history of Hezbollah’s development in Lebanon fairly accurately. 
 Constructivist explanations of Iran’s support to Hezbollah possess the same 
failings of the ideological explanations, but with fewer fatal flaws.  Cultural imperatives 
include religion, but are not necessary limited by religious ideology.  Iran’s long history 
of religious and multicultural tolerance goes a long way towards explaining how the 
ideologically uncompromising Islamic Republic could allow Hezbollah to participate in 
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confessional politics.  Unfortunately, it also explains how Iran could be completely 
opposed to the same.  Within Iran’s cultural identity reside multiple contradictory 
tendencies, which can only be worked out in the context of real-world events.  As an 
explanatory model, constructivist explanations may provide some insight after the fact, 
but fails to offer any predictive capability. 
 Two-level game theory offers the greatest degree of explanatory fidelity regarding 
Iran’s support to Hezbollah.  Treating Iran’s support to Hezbollah as an iterative process 
in which multiple players are involved, and each decision affects each subsequent 
decision, provides both the flexibility and necessary complexity to establish a sufficiently 
complete explanation for Iran’s Hezbollah policy.   
The domestic and foreign policy interests of Israel, Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah 
merged in such a way as to allow each entity to use the participation of each other in 
order to justify their actions.  Rafsanjani’s pragmatic government, otherwise averse to 
international terrorism, supported Hezbollah’s retaliation against Israel’s assassination of 
Musawi.  Israel’s actions not only demanded a response—it guaranteed it by re-
establishing long-standing ties between Hezbollah and the radical leftist clerical factions 
in Iran.  Iran’s Hezbollah policy began as a result of several factors alluded to in the 
ideological explanation.  Common experience provided the groundwork of personal 
relationships and ideological commonality between the Iranian revolutionary clergy and 
many of the clergy in Lebanon.  Further, Asad’s bet on the future clerical regime and 
facilitation of Iranian/Lebanese relations contributed to Iran’s future foreign policy.81  In 
contrast to any possible ideological or constructivist explanation, however, this critical 
alliance between Syria, Iran, and Lebanon not only survived the Hama massacre, but the 
Iranian regime publicly supported Asad’s actions.  As the alliance continued, roles shifted 
as a result of the decisions made by each interested party on behalf of not only national 
interest, but domestic politics and the secondary and tertiary effects of political decisions 
on the alliance. 
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IV. IRAN’S ANTI-ISRAEL POLICY 
Iran’s anti-Israel policy has a complex history.  From the beginning of the 
revolution, this policy was foundational, yet also abandoned for the purposes of 
expediency.  During the early 1980s, when Iran desperately needed weapons in its fight 
against Iraq, Israel was its secret supplier.  In the mid-1980s, Israel once again stepped in 
as the principal agent for Iran in acquiring U.S.-made weapons for the war with Iraq.  
Anti-Israel rhetoric aside, Iranian activity against Israel was limited primarily to military 
targets until the early 1990s.  Embracing Palestinian rejectionists beginning in 1992, Iran 
assumed the mantle of the Palestinian cause, softening its revolutionary rhetoric of 
spreading the Islamic revolution in favor of standing up to Israeli and Western 
aggression.  Welcoming the change in tone, Iran’s neighboring Arab states renewed 
diplomatic relations with the Shia state.  Rafsanani, Iran’s new president, then began a 
process of decreasing Iranian support to both Hezbollah and the Palestinians in an effort 
to improve ties with the West and rebuild Iran’s economy. 
Realist explanations of Iran’s anti-Israel policy convincingly describe Iran’s 
shifting foreign policy in terms of gaining the support of Arab states to off-set the threat 
from Israel, as well as its subsequent move away from the anti-Israel policy in order to 
improve relations with the West.  Neither ideological nor constructivist arguments 
address these shifts in a meaningful way.  Factionalist explanations attribute these foreign 
policy shifts less to the imperatives of international relations and more to the domestic 
goals of Rafsanjani and his modernist right faction, the Kargozaran.  Two-level game 
theory uses both explanations, as well as the interactions of Israeli and American foreign 
policy, to fill in explanatory gaps left by each, such as why Khatami would risk détente 
with the U.S. by sending weapons to the Palestinian Authority (discussed, below), or why 
Rafsanjani would defect from the reformist movement, abandoning over a decade of 
political progress towards improving relations with the West. 
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A. HISTORY 
The history of Iran’s anti-Israel policy goes back to the beginning of the Islamic 
Republic—it is a foundational element of the revolution, going hand-in-hand with the 
demonization of the U.S. and Western imperialism.  Iran’s active foreign policy towards 
Israel throughout the 1980s, however, was ambiguous.  On one hand, it was the force 
behind Hezbollah’s fight to expel Israel from Lebanon.  On the other hand, it was with 
Israel’s help that Iran was able to procure weapons in exchange for U.S. hostages held in 
Lebanon—and initially, the weapons themselves came from Israel’s armories.  But this 
collusion between Israel and Iran against Saddam Hussein was short-lived.  The defeat of 
Iraq in the first Gulf War mitigated Iraq as a threat to both countries.  That defeat allowed 
both Iran and Israel to restructure their foreign policies to face the regional threat that 
remained—each other. 
The end of the civil war in Lebanon created an existential crisis for Hezbollah.  
Allowed to survive as the result of an agreement between Iran and Syria, Hezbollah 
turned towards consolidating its political and social position throughout the 1990s, 
continuing to serve its role as Iran’s deniable paramilitary force.  It facilitated Iranian 
relations with Hamas, executed terrorist attacks abroad in 1992 and 1994, and continued 
to harass northern Israel with rocket fire, all the while refashioning its image from that of 
just a paramilitary force to that of a political and charitable organization as well.  Israeli 
military operations, such as Grapes of Wrath, backfired when non-military Hezbollah 
targets were destroyed, and reinforced Hezbollah’s legitimacy with the population.82  
This restructuring and subsequent legitimacy not only led to political opportunities for 
Hezbollah within the Lebanese political system, but also enabled it to establish goodwill 
across sectarian lines, particularly with the mass expulsion of Hamas members from the 
Palestinian territories in 1992. 
Iran’s somewhat troubled alliance with the Palestinian cause was long established 
by the time of the first intifada.  Khomeini’s public and unqualified support for the 
elimination of Israel went back to at least 1962, when he argued that Israel was the 
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West’s agent in an imperialist plot to control the Middle East.83  Seeking inroads to more 
actively support the Palestinian cause was thus a long-standing national priority of the 
Islamic Republic.  The PLO, a previous ally, burned bridges with Iran during the Iran-
Iraq War by supporting Saddam Hussein.  The emergence of Hamas and Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, therefore, presented Iran with a desirable alternative to Arafat.  Israel’s 
expulsion of Hamas’ leadership facilitated Iran’s long-sought opportunity to support the 
Palestinian cause, insofar as that cause called for the rejection of the legitimacy of the 
Jewish State. 
Using Hezbollah as intermediaries to offer Hamas support, Iran began providing 
Hamas with training, weapons, and financial resources with which to conduct operations 
against Israel.  This bridged a critical gap towards fulfilling Iran’s espoused ideology of 
supporting the Palestinians without being forced to make amends with the PLO.84  
Hamas, subsequently, transitioned from being a “one-trick suicide-bombing” 
organization to a significant paramilitary force.  By 2008, Hamas fighters had been 
training at IRGC camps in Tehran for over two years, with the intention of gaining at 
least the same level of proficiency demonstrated by Hezbollah during the 2006 war with 
Israel.85   
The experience of the previous decade, however, offers examples of a less than 
strident opposition to Israel, particularly with reference to the arms-for-hostages scandal.  
The Iranians involved clearly understood Israel’s desire to create an “alliance of the 
periphery” for the advantage of the non-Arab states in the Middle East, and at the very 
least paid some lip-service to the effect that they might support a peripheral alliance in 
the future.  Clearly, this was not the path Iran chose to follow.  Iran chose to redefine the 
basis of the Middle East’s regional alliance taxonomy from nationalism to religion.   
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The Iraq war was the single greatest obstacle to Iran’s efforts to redefine alliance 
structures in the Middle East away from nationalism and towards religion.  As the Arab 
states lined up behind Saddam Hussein, Iran was regionally isolated and sought 
opportunities to undermine its enemies and build alliances where it could.  The tanker 
wars, for example, demonstrated both Iran’s restraint (prior to 1987), as well as its 
willingness to strike out against Iraq’s financial allies.  Iran’s crucial alliance with Syria 
not only enabled access to Lebanon, but also provided its only geo-strategically relevant 
partner in the war against Iraq.  Iran’s alliance with Arab states enabled it to claim that it 
possessed no enmity toward Arabs, and its consistent support for Hezbollah and later, 
Hamas, justified its claim to be the vanguard of an Islamic revolution.  Hamas’ choice of 
Iran for its first official visit underscores Iran’s success in courting the Palestinian 
cause.86 
The era of pragmatism ushered in by Rafsanjani revealed new limitations to the 
extent to which Iran was willing to export the revolution.  Rafsanjani, in keeping with 
Khomeini’s “Open Window” policy, which he spearheaded in 1985, attempted through 
multiple channels to improve its international standing in order to salvage the post-war 
economy.  The austerity of forced economic isolation during the previous decade 
ironically left Iran in reasonable financial shape.  Iran’s domestic economy still had to 
recover from the physical damage of the war, and Rafsanjani’s approach towards 
rebuilding the economy started with structural reform. 
Attempting to separate domestic factionalism from foreign policy, the Supreme 
National Security Council was established.  This was followed by the resumption of 
economic relations with the U.K., though little changed with respect to Iran’s strident 
anti-Israel policy or its effort to assert its moral and religious authority in the Middle 
East. 
Though Iran gave many indications that its Islamist rhetoric was mere bluster, at 
no point did it make an official public break with its anti-Israel ideology.  Rafsanjani’s 
denial of Israel’s involvement in the arms-for-hostages scandal underscores the strength 
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of feeling associated with Israel in Iran at the time, “We have never negotiated with 
Israel. . .  If we find out that the weapons reaching us have come through Israel, we will 
not even use them in the warfronts.”87  Reality notwithstanding, public association with 
Israeli arms deals was more than any politician could bear, and undermined the position 
Iran was attempting to assume in the Middle East. 
By the end of the Rafsanjani era, however, popular attitudes within Iran towards 
the U.S. and even Israel shifted.  Khatami’s election signaled the end of Iran’s 
transformation away from a revolutionary mentality.  Iran’s revolutionary phase was 
sustained by the Iran-Iraq War; its end, and Khomeini’s death, led to post-revolutionary 
reconstruction under Rafsanjani.  Khatami’s ascendance marked a new phase in Iran’s 
domestic politics in which multiple leftist factions vied for power with little pretense for 
revolutionary credibility.   
Khatami was never supposed to actually win the presidential election—his role 
was to mobilize the population just enough to give the election a democratic sheen.88  
The government fully and vocally supported the election of Nateq-Noori.  Their mistake 
in choosing Khatami revealed the breadth of the gap between the traditionalist right of the 
majority SCC and popular opinion.  The Islamic left’s ACC and Rafsanjani’s Executives 
of Reconstruction, backing Khatami, therefore created a popular alternative to the 
“revolutionary” platform of the SCC. 
Rafsanjani’s legacy of improved relations with Iran’s Arab neighbors allowed 
Khatami to pursue improved relations with the U.S. by softening its anti-Israel policy.89  
In 1998 he allowed a senior administration official to be interviewed by an Israeli 
newspaper where she was quoted as stating, “I support a dialogue between Iranians and 
Israelis, but it is too early to speak of political dialogue between Iran and Israel.”90  
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Further, Khatami himself stated that although Iran remained opposed to the peace 
process, Iran was not opposed to any peace process.91  In line with Rafsanjani’s long-
standing desire for improved relations with the U.S. as a means towards improving Iran’s 
economic condition, and transparent in accordance with the principles of the Khatami and 
the ACC, these moves were welcomed by the U.S. 
Taking advantage of the openness of the new regime, the Clinton administration 
launched a series of diplomatic gestures designed to reciprocate Khatami’s détente and 
bolster his domestic position against the modernist and traditionalist right.92  At the same 
time, Khatami himself engaged in a bitter fight for his political survival.   
Khatami’s reforms were antithetical to the politics of the SCC.  Hard-liners set out 
to undermine or ruin his policies and supporters.  Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the mayor 
of Tehran and a supporter of Khatami, was indicted on corruption charges and sentenced 
to a five-year prison term.93  Abdollah Nuri, the Minister of Interior, was impeached.  
Many reformist publications were closed down by court orders—others, burned to the 
ground.94  Rahim Safavi, the commander of the IRGC, specifically linked Khatami’s 
softening U.S. policy to the increasing anti-reformist violence.95  The Clinton 
administration’s efforts to support Khatami, though substantial, were hardly proportional.  
The U.S. placed the MEK on the State Department’s list of terrorist organizations, 
removed Iran from the list of states that support drug trafficking, granted ILSA waivers to 
some European companies and eliminated some trade restrictions, and the President 
Clinton made a dinner speech offering a “diplomatic” apology for interfering in Iran’s 
domestic politics prior to the revolution.96  Unwilling to do more as a result of Saudi  
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Arabia’s disclosure of evidence implicating Hezbollah and Iran in the Khobar Towers 
bombing in 1996, the Clinton administration ultimately left the reformers to their own 
devices.97  
The internal schism between the SCC and the ACC was manifested in an 
incoherent policy towards Israel.  Iran’s rhetoric unequivocally supported Palestinian 
rejectionists, but in actuality Iranian support was minimal even after the start of the 
Second Intifada.98  The defeat of the ACC at the hands of the traditionalist right in mid 
1999, and the defection of Rafsanjani’s Kargozoran back to the SCC took the right’s 
objections to improved foreign relations with the West off the table.99  Therefore, despite 
their institutional control of the defense establishment and rhetorical antipathy towards 
the West, the traditionalist / modernist coalition prized economic development over 
Palestinian rejectionism. 
The U.S. presidential election of 2000 ushered in an expectation of improved 
relations with Iran.  Vice President Cheney, as the CEO of Halliburton, favored doing 
away with the ILSA and renewing economic ties with Iran.100  The new administration, 
however, was slow to act and proponents of the ILSA—specifically, AIPAC—gathered 
the necessary congressional support to have the sanctions renewed.101  Iran’s 
ambivalence with respect to Israel did not translate into Israeli ambivalence with respect 
to Iran, as Iran possessed a military capability on Israel’s borders, while Israel possessed 
no such capability on Iran’s. 
September 11 did not, therefore, change the new administration’s view towards 
Iran—in fact, it brought Iran’s potential as a strategic ally into sharp relief.  The principal 
policy shift involved for the U.S. regarded policy towards Afghanistan in the “six plus 
two” talks.  Iran’s position was that the Taliban needed to be forcibly removed from 
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Afghanistan, and the U.S. adopted that same goal after September 11.102  Breaking away 
from the rest of the six plus two, except for Germany and Italy, the U.S. and Iran 
cooperated on Operation Enduring Freedom, with Iran providing extensive intelligence 
on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, contacts within the Northern Alliance, and even using U.S. 
intelligence to kill or capture al-Qaeda fighters fleeing Afghanistan.103  Despite this new 
strategic alliance, the new U.S. administration’s policy towards Iran was not going to be 
what one might expect from the Vice President’s pre-election statements as CEO of 
Halliburton.  Other voices in the administration believed that any engagement with Iran 
must be tied to Iran’s anti-Israel policies, and their influence led to the next big setback in 
U.S.-Iranian relations—President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech. 
After the ACC and Khatami caved to pressure from the traditionalist right in 
1999, the reformers became increasingly vulnerable to domestic criticism.  Following 
September 11, despite relatively broad-based support for Iran’s cooperation with the 
U.S., elements within the SCC leadership were poised to use it against Khatami at the 
first opportunity.  That opportunity came with President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union 
speech.  According to Kenneth Pollack, the speech was not written specifically with Iran 
in mind—a third country was needed to make the line work, and Iran was handy in the 
wake of the Karine A incident.104  Nevertheless, it provided just the ammunition the 
traditionalists needed in order to discredit Khatami’s “soft” foreign policy.   
By Khatami’s second term in 2001, Iran’s institutional leadership were forced to 
make a decision regarding whose policies guided them—the President or the Supreme 
Leader.105  In the case of the Basij and IRGC, the answer was clearly the Supreme 
Leader, both of whom took increasingly active roles supporting the traditionalist right.  
These military institutions, among others (such as the Council of Guardians, which vets 
all potential political candidates and frequently disqualifies liberals from holding office), 
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allowed the newly militarized “neoconservative” camp, allied with the traditionalists, to 
dominate the election of the seventh Majles in 2004.106  By disqualifying more than 
2,500 candidates, conservatives won 156 out of 290 Majles seats.107 
The elimination of liberal voices in Iranian politics led to increased support to 
Hezbollah, and Palestinian rejectionists, as well as anti-Israel and U.S. rhetoric.  By 
maintaining control over powerful institutions within the Iranian government, the 
traditionalist right subverted the political process in order to ensure complete control over 
Iranian domestic and foreign policy. 
B. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Realist, ideological, factional, constructivist, and two-level game theory 
explanations for Iran’s anti-Israel policy each add something to one’s overall 
understanding; but two-level game theory, again, incorporates elements from each 
explanation as part of a dynamic process that more accurately describes how events really 
occur.  Realist explanations for Iran’s anti-Israel policy focus on Iran’s desire to use the 
Palestinian cause as a means for allying itself with its Arab neighbors against Israeli 
power.  Shifts in Iranian policy in the 1980s are easily accounted for by the immediacy of 
the existential threat from Iraq.  Ideological explanations focus on Iran’s long-term 
commitment to the Palestinian cause and antipathy towards Israel as a foundational 
element of revolutionary thought.  Factionalist explanations describe shifts in Iran’s 
policy as elements of ongoing internal political struggles between the traditionalist right, 
modernist right, liberals / reformists, and the neoconservatives.  Constructivists rely on 
cultural and religious imperatives allying Iran with Palestinians against Israel.  Two-level 
game theory explains Iran’s anti-Israel policy as a dynamic process in which the internal 
factional disputes of liberal and conservative elements combine with the demands of 
regional power politics, and shifting foreign policies of the U.S. in such a way that no 
particular move by either Iran or any other regional power (to include the U.S.) can be 
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predicted without considering multiple possible motivating factors.  Each explanation has 
explanatory strengths, and weaknesses, but in the end, two-level game theory is the only 
one with sufficient explanatory strength. 
 Realist explanations for Iran’s anti-Israel policy focus on Iran’s desire to use the 
Palestinian cause as a means for allying itself with its Arab neighbors against Israeli 
power.  Winning the support of the “Arab street,” Iran first hoped to spread the 
revolution, viewing itself as a potential regional hegemon.  The backlash from this 
resulted in the moderation of Iran’s foreign policy.  Maintaining its anti-Israel policy, in 
which it was heavily invested, Iran sought to recast itself as a vanguard of Muslim unity.  
As Iran’s moderate image took hold, Rafsanjani renewed diplomatic ties with estranged 
Arab states—to include Saudi Arabia—and was thus able to moderate the stridency of its 
anti-Israel policy as well.  Seeking to build its power base with Arab states and portray 
itself as benign in order to revitalize the economy, the anti-Israel policy became less 
politically useful in the 1990s.  The rise of Khatami, however, introduces a problem for 
realist explanations of Iran’s anti-Israel policy.  Khatami’s foreign policy was little more 
than an extension of Rafsanjani’s, with the exception that vis-à-vis the U.S., it was paying 
dividends.  Clearly, internal factionalist disputes rather than rational interest was a 
significant factor in Iran’s abandoning of its moderating Israel policy and the Karine A 
incident.  If the Karine A incident was manufactured by Israel,  as has been suggested by 
multiple authors, this criticism would have to be reevaluated.108 
 Ideological explanations account for Iran’s ideological predisposition to oppose 
Israel.  This explanation fails, however, to explain inconsistencies in Iran’s foreign 
policy—particularly with respect to Israeli arms sales during the war with Iraq, and the 
waxing and waning of Iranian support to Hezbollah and Palestinian rejectionists, 
depending on which faction was in power at the time. 
 Factional explanations account for many of the dynamics of Iran’s anti Israel 
policy, particularly in the post-Khomeini years as factional disputes were not moderated 
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by the Supreme Leader.  The policies of Rafsanjani, meant to alleviate Western concerns 
over Khomeini-era radicalism, were continued by the modernist right / reformist coalition 
of Khatami’s 23 May Movement.  Rafsanani’s defection to the traditionalists, allied with 
Khameini, and their institutional control over the military, in turn led to a reradicalization 
of Iranian policy towards Israel, supporting Palestinian rejectionists and encouraging 
adventurism by Hezbollah.   
 Constructivist explanations of Iran’s anti-Israel policy emphasize the binding 
cultural and religious values that unify Iran against the state of Israel.  Constructivists 
point to examples such as the Qods (Jerusalem) Force, in which foundational 
revolutionary organizations are tied to the elimination of Israel as part of their charter.  
The connection of the traditionalist right and the neoconservatives is particularly strong, 
as would be expected, but constructivist explanations become problematic when 
considering the Islamic Left.   
 Dominating the Office of Liberation Movements and the IRGC during the early 
years of the revolution, members of the Islamic Left were among the most violent 
opponents of Israel and the West.  They were responsible for sabotaging early dealings 
with Israel and the U.S. in the arms-for-hostages scandal, as well as the conduct of 
hijacking, suicide bombings, and the taking of the very hostages whose release the 
government of Iran sought to “negotiate.”  By the 1990s, however, the Islamic Left grew 
disillusioned with isolation and the revolutionary conception of the velayat-e faqih, 
seeking democratic reforms, accountability, and modernization as cornerstones of the 23 
May Movement.109  Along with these, the reformers of the 23 May Movement 
functionally abandoned Iran’s long-standing anti-Israel policy, with no effect on their 
popularity at the poles.  Failing to explain the evolution of the Islamic Left into the 
reform movement (and their alliance with the modernist right) in purely constructivist 
terms, one looks for a more comprehensive explanation for Iran’s anti-Israel policy. 
 Two-level game theory offers the most robust explanation for Iran’s anti-Israel 
policy.  While factionalist disputes clearly played a significant role in Iran’s constantly 
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changing level of interest in opposing Israel, realist regional objectives also played a 
role—particularly during the Iran-Iraq War.  Further, Rafsanjani’s post-Khomeini 
economic reconstruction plan required that Iran assure the West that it would not engage 
in acts of terrorism, and by the end of the Rafsanjani era, Iran transitioned to becoming a 
relatively “responsible” regional presence.  Khatami continued that trend, and even began 
a process of rapprochement with the U.S. under the Clinton administration.  The actions 
of multiple parties, however, contributed to the demise of that process—not the least of 
which was factionalist infighting within Iran.  The dialogue-like process between the 
internal struggle of Iranian policy with respect to Israel and the actions of outside 
governments, however, it what two-level game theory emphasizes.  It is through this 















V. IRAN’S NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 
Iran’s nuclear development program was long suspected during the 1990s; but it 
was not until 2002 that an enrichment facility at Natanz and a heavy-water facility at 
Arak was disclosed by an Iranian dissident group.  Both facilities were primitive, but took 
the U.S. and the rest of the international community by surprise.  Calls for an immediate 
suspension of the program were made, and negotiations began to come up with a long-
term solution to international concerns over Iran’s obligations as a signatory to the Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT).  Subsequent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
inspections were suspended, and according to Mark Fitzpatrick, Iran can produce enough 
weapons-grade Uranium to be used in a bomb within “a couple of months.”110 
Realist explanations for Iran’s nuclear program, as well as factional and two-level 
game theory explanations, are all coherent.  Iran would likely be more secure as a result 
of having a nuclear capability.  There is no political faction within Iran that is opposed to 
a nuclear capability, though there are factions that would accept a security guarantee from 
the U.S. and renewed economic ties in lieu of continuing the program.  Two-level game 
theory explanations likewise, taking advantage of realist and factional explanations, 
maintain coherence.  Ideological and constructivist explanations both fail to address why 
Khomeini would break with his stated opposition to nuclear weapons by maintaining a 
nuclear program throughout the 1980s, or why Khameini and the rest of the 
“revolutionary” clergy would explicitly break with Khomeini’s ideology in order to 
develop a weapons program. 
A. HISTORY 
Iran’s isolation from the West continued largely until the strategic opening in the 
aftermath of 9/11.  Khatami’s second term and the common interests of the U.S. and Iran 
against the Taliban aligned briefly, until the discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear facilities 
and the Karine A incident led back to the status quo.  Internal politics then took on a role 
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as the rise of a generation of neoconservative politicians in 2005, promoting the nuclear 
issue, attests to the emotive appeal of a nuclear capability for much of the electorate.  
Nevertheless, as the NIC estimate of 2007 points out, the program began several years 
prior to the public promotion of the issue.  The reasons behind it, therefore, were not 
related to its domestic appeal. 
The principal figures behind Iran’s nuclear development program during the 
Khomeini era were Mir Hossein Musavi, the Prime Minister (and “green” candidate for 
the recent presidential election), and Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the powerful 
Speaker of the Majles.111  Musavi was a staunch member of the Islamic Left throughout 
the 1980s, heavily involved with Lebanese Hezbollah and the arms-for-hostages scandal, 
as mentioned in Chapter II.  Together they managed to keep Iran’s nuclear program alive 
throughout the Iran-Iraq War.  During his subsequent terms as president, Rafsanjani 
managed to begin serious development of the nuclear program. 
Khatami continued Rafsanjani’s efforts until the discovery of the centrifuge 
enrichment facility at Natanz in 2002.  Further revelations unleashed a firestorm of 
concern in the West, and demands for immediate suspension of the program as well as a 
strict inspection regime per Iran’s status as a signatory to the NPT.112  Crossing factional 
lines, Iran’s nuclear program enjoyed broad-based support from both the left (Khatami’s 
reformist movement) and right (both Rafsanjani’s modern right and Khameini’s 
traditionalists).  It was under Khatami, however, that the nuclear program flourished, as a 
result of the premium the Khatami administration placed on technical expertise as 
opposed to religious and revolutionary credentials.113  The near-universal support the 
nuclear program enjoyed, however, was not unqualified.  According to Takeyh, Iran’s 
willingness to concede to the demands of the West with a long-term voluntary suspension 
of the program was undermined by the U.S. administration’s constant pressure on the 
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Europeans for more Iranian concessions.114  In the end, Khatami’s administration came 
to an end and Rafsanjani lost the next election to Ahmadinedjad. 
Assuming power in a disconcerting foreign policy climate, Ahmadinedjad, 
predisposed to supporting the nuclear development program in defiance of the U.S., 
found justification in the comparative outcomes of Iraqi and North Korean nuclear 
development programs.  Iraq, without a nuclear capability, was invaded by the U.S.  
North Korea, with its demonstrated nuclear capability, was not.  Ahmadinedjad’s 
calculation, therefore, was simple.  He retained the eminently efficient Gholam Reza 
Aghazadeh from the previous two successive Khatami administrations, until Aghazadeh’s 
resignation in 2009 (presumably in protest over the contested elections).115  Restarting 
the nuclear program in early 2006, Iran continues to defy calls for suspending their 
enrichment program.  The 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran states that 
Iran could have a nuclear weapon sometime between 2010 and 2015. 
B. THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
Realist explanations for Iran’s nuclear development program maintain that 
Ahmadinedjad’s calculation, above, demonstrates merely a continued, rational pursuit of 
regional security.  Given the fact that Iran maintained its nuclear program—though only 
barely—throughout the Khomeini era, it is difficult to find fault with this logic.  Realism 
does not tell the whole story, however, as economics, factionalist disputes, ideologies, 
and the policies of other states, come into play in the discussion of Iran’s nuclear 
development program. 
Realist explanations for Iranian foreign policy claim that national security 
interests drive Iran’s nuclear development program.  Prior to 2003, the Iranian program 
was driven primarily by the threat posed by Iraq, particularly after Saddam’s use of 
chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran/Iraq war.  The strength of feeling 
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associated with the national memory of the war is demonstrated by the support for the 
nuclear program among the Iranian population.116  Whether or not Iran undertook to 
construct a nuclear capability after the war, there was a desire and need for some form of 
strategic deterrent.  
There is little dispute now that Iran had a nuclear weapons development program 
from the late 1980s until 2003.117  For the purpose of defense against the Iraqi regime 
and its Arab state supporters, Iran found itself isolated in the Middle East, in much the 
same situation as Israel, throughout the 1980s.  Attempting to export the Islamic 
revolution only exacerbated Iran’s isolation, providing enough justification for other 
Arab states to provide support to Iraq.  While relations with the Arab states (other than 
Iraq) improved somewhat under Rafsanjani and Khatami, it was not until 1997 that Iran 
had its first major diplomatic breakthrough, hosting the OIC in Tehran.118 
Ideological explanations for Iran’s nuclear development program emphasize the 
bellicose comments of the Iranian leadership regarding Israel, their longstanding support 
to groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, and the ultimate authority of the Supreme 
Leader.  Proponents of the view of Iranian foreign policy as being driven by religious 
ideology need look no further than the stated policy of Ayatollah Khomeini for support, 
with his policy of “exporting the revolution.”  Subsequent leaders, particularly 
Ahmadinedjad, further reinforce popular caricatures of Iranian foreign policy through the 
use of rhetoric, often designed for Arab audiences, about “wiping Israel off the map.”  
Advocates of Iranian factional motivations as the driving forces behind the 
development of a nuclear capability include the authors of the RAND report, Mullahs, 
Guards, and Bonyads.119  According to the RAND report, informal factions within Iran 
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are the principle driving forces behind Iranian policies.120  Some authors, such as those of 
the RAND study, emphasize factional differences to explain changes in Iranian policy, 
while other’s, such as Mehdi Moslem, point to the relationships between various factions 
to state institutions to explain the overall consistency of Iranian policy.121 
The elimination of Saddam’s regime in 2003 was preceded by the emergence of a 
new existential threat in 2002.  The “Axis of Evil” speech ended a brief period of 
cooperation between the U.S. and Iran, and undermined Khatami’s attempt at achieving 
Iran’s foreign policy interests through cooperation with the West.122  The U.S. replaced 
Iraq as Iran’s principal existential threat, and Iran’s hard-liners turned the nuclear 
program into a populist issue.  Takeyh quotes Rafsanjani’s assessment of the politics of 
Iran’s nuclear program, “No official would dare allow himself to defy the people on such 
and issue.”123  Iranian neoconservatives took advantage of this in 2005, taking an 
uncompromising stand in order to demonstrate revolutionary credentials.124  Regardless 
of Guardian’s Council gerrymandering, the neoconservatives’ brand of populist 
nationalism resonated with a large portion of the Iranian population. 
Given the statements and actions of the U.S. following the “Axis of Evil” speech, 
it is no surprise that Iran believes that the U.S. poses a genuine existential threat.  As long 
as Iran does not possess a nuclear capability, it will continue to feel threatened.  The 
lesson of North Korea and Iraq is that the only way to guarantee regime survival is to 
possess a credible deterrent.  North Korea, possessing nuclear weapons, survives, unlike 
the Iraqi regime, which apparently did not do enough to dispel the assumption that it was 
developing some sort of WMD. 
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Central to understanding the interests that drive Iran’s foreign policy is the 
question of whether the purpose of Iran’s nuclear program is the construction of a 
weapon or if Iran’s purposes are peaceful.  Despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear 
program is benign, the international community remains suspicious.  The revelation in 
2002 of the extent of Iran’s nuclear program, with the previously unreported, and 
immediately denied, construction of plants at Arak and Natanz, exacerbated suspicions 
previously surrounding the plant at Bushehr, and undermined Iran’s argument of a 
peaceful development program.125  Focusing on the intent to enrich uranium, Iran 
claimed that they had not violated the NPT; the IAEA, however, took the view that the 
existence of enrichment facilities suggested such intent.  The fact that Iran had not been 
forthcoming, and then denied the existence of facilities discovered as a result of a leak 
from the MEK-associated National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) only made 
matters worse.126  According to the 2007 NIE, Iran had a weapons development program 
that was halted as of 2003, and that halt continues.127  If this is the case, then a range of 
explanations must be explored. 
Arguments that Iran’s nuclear program was peaceful all along are specious.  If 
Iran’s nuclear program had been for research purposes, it could have done with much 
smaller and more economical research reactors.  If it had been for the purposes of energy, 
it could have used more efficient light-water reactors.  Further, Iran is sitting on a sea of 
oil, with the third (possibly second) largest proven reserves in the world.128  If Iran 
wanted to improve its energy situation, it could simply increase its refining capacity so 
that it would not have to be a net importer of gas, as it is today.129 
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Constructivist arguments that the current nuclear program is primarily intended to 
increase Iran’s regional “prestige and influence” contain elements of truth, but don’t take 
into account Iran’s history of deceit or adequately explain Iran’s insistence on developing 
a program with a nuclear break-out capability.130  As former President Rafsanjani stated 
himself in 2004, “That we are on the verge of a nuclear break-out is true.”131  The NIE 
and others would claim this as an example of Iran trumpeting its achievements in order to 
gain prestige and influence.132  The truth in the argument is in the fact that Iran certainly 
gains from the prestige and influence resulting from its defiance of the U.S..  While this 
certainly helps Iran achieve some of its foreign policy objectives, it does not achieve the 
policy objective of regime survival.  In fact, it threatens it—which leads to the most 
convincing argument that Iran’s nuclear program is, in fact, benign. 
The game-theory approach to Iran’s nuclear development program is instructive.  
In this model, the realist explanation rightly accounts for a rational foreign policy in 
which Iran seeks regional security through nuclear parity.  It explains Iran’s willingness 
to engage in brinkmanship with the international community after the discovery of its 
development program because of its internal popularity.  Successive dealings with the 
U.S., in particular, add an iterative dimension in that by holding the U.S. at bay in Iraq, 
Iran was able to buy some time against both regime change and the U.S. administration.  
In this way, the U.S. invasion of Iraq not only eliminated the Baathist regime from Iran’s 
doorstep, but effectively limited the ability of the U.S. to effect regime change in Iran as 
well. 
Iranian officials consistently claim that the development of a nuclear weapons 
capability is counterproductive.  Their claim, contrary to the lesson of North Korea, is 
that “The existence of nuclear weapons will turn us into a threat that could be exploited in 
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dangerous ways to harm our relations with the countries of the region.”133  In other 
words, a serious attempt to develop a nuclear weapon, if discovered by the U.S., would 
result in an attack.  The lesson of Iraq is that a country that attempts to develop WMD 
may be attacked—but that lesson was not learned until after Iran began its nuclear 
development program.  That is not to say the lesson cannot be invoked—it is not a stretch 
to imagine that Iran is less reckless in its foreign policy than Iraq.  Given the timeline, 
however, and the circumstances surrounding Iran’s disclosures to the IAEA regarding the 
existence and capabilities of its nuclear facilities, it is difficult to believe that Iran went to 
so much effort for any reason but to develop a nuclear weapon.  Besides offering no 
positive explanation for the existence of the program, this argument also possesses the 
fatal flaw of putting Iran in possession of a program that appears to be a weapons 
development program indefinitely, which puts Iran in a perpetual state of external threat.   
The 2007 NIE claims that Iran gave up its weapons development program in 
2003.  If this is true, and if Iran’s position is taken to mean that now that the program has 
been discovered, it no longer seeks to develop nuclear weapons, then the last two 
arguments, above, become much more credible.  However, it still leaves Iran in the 
uncomfortable position of maintaining a nuclear program on the verge of a capability, 
which, if realized (and discovered), would certainly lead to the destruction of the regime.  
Further, given the popularity of the nuclear program with the Iranian people, its 
supporters in the military and scientific communities, unanimous political support among 
top leaders, and Iran’s penchant for conducting highly efficient, secretive, and risky 
programs (such as their nuclear weapons program), it would be naïve to assume that Iran 
will not seek to continue its weapons development program at the first opportunity.  As 
stated in the NIE, the nuclear power program continues—it is only the weapons 
development program that has halted. 
As already mentioned, Iran’s nuclear program is driven by national security 
interests and the desire for regional hegemony.  The nuclear program increases the 
prestige of Iran, showing that it is a developed, industrialized state, regardless of whether 
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or not it possesses a nuclear weapon.  Its defiance of the international community in 
general, and the U.S. in particular, further enhances its reputation by demonstrating that it 
is capable of “standing up” to the superpower—something no other Middle Eastern state 
has managed to do.  This earns regional respect and influence, which is an end in itself.  
The history of the disclosure of Iran’s nuclear program, however, suggests that this was 
not always its purpose.  So long as the program was secret, its likely purpose was the 
development of a nuclear weapon.  Once the program was publicly disclosed, however, 
internal politics dictated its continued support, and in the process Iran discovered that its 
game of brinkmanship with the IAEA and the Security Council was its own reward, in 
terms of improving Iran’s image in the Arab world.  This approach, however, marked a 
drastic change to Iran’s regional foreign policy.  Understanding this shift requires an 
examination of the three eras of Iranian politics since the death of Khomeini—the 
pragmatist, reformer, and neoconservative eras. 
Iran’s attempts to improve regional state-to-state relations began in earnest with 
the rise of President Rafsanjani from 1989 to 1997, and continued under Khatami’s 
reformist agenda from 1997 to 2004.  Rafsanjani sought improved economic and political 
relations with regional Arab states as well as Western Europe, and made some progress 
through his attempts at economic liberalization in pursuit of a loan from the International 
Monetary Fund.  His efforts were limited, however, due to Iran’s continued support for 
terrorist activity abroad.  Iran supported the MEK inside Iraq, multiple assassinations of 
Iranian dissidents abroad, and the 1992 and 94 bombings of the Israeli Embassy and a 
Jewish community center in Buenos Aires.  This activity eventually resulted in U.S. 
sanctions through the Iran-Libya Sanctions act of 1996, curtailing U.S. trade and limiting 
trade with non-U.S. companies as well.134  Despite increased economic liberalization, 
Iran’s foreign policy under Rafsanjani ultimately resulted in major economic setbacks 
and a loss of confidence in Iran. 
Khatami’s challenge, therefore, was to assure the international community that 
Iran could be a responsible actor in the international community.  Aggressively seeking to 
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continue Rafsanjani’s policy of regional economic and political engagement, Khatami 
hosted the OIC in 1997, resulting in improved relations with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
UAE.  In Europe, Khatami’s major successes were the revival of diplomatic relations 
with Italy, France, and the UK.135  Iran’s policy of engagement during this period not 
only met the goal of improving economic ties for the purpose of improving the domestic 
economy.  It also demonstrated Iran’s desire and ability to behave as a “responsible 
actor,” in sharp contrast to the behavior of its principal threat at the time, Saddam’s Iraq.  
By hosting the OIC, improving relations with the Arab states, and regaining legitimacy 
with major Western powers, Iran decreased the likelihood that Iraq could attack with any 
international support ever again. 
Within the context of this increasingly rational environment, the attacks of 9/11 
managed to align U.S. and Iranian interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan, and common 
opposition to the Taliban regime.  Iranian opposition to the Taliban manifested itself 
throughout the 1990s by Iran’s support of Ahmad Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance, 
based out of Dushanbe.  Cooperating with the U.S. by facilitating contact with the 
Northern Alliance, Iran / U.S. relations appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough.136  
In 2002, however, with the discovery of Iran’s undeclared nuclear facilities, the situation 
changed, and U.S. / Iranian détente came to an end. 
The timing of the Axis of Evil speech ensured that the U.S. would replace Iraq as 
Iran’s existential threat in the post-Saddam era, thus galvanizing populist support for the 
pursuit of a nuclear program.  As argued elsewhere, Iran’s nuclear program already had 
internal support from the military, the scientific community, and political interests.137  
The populist appeal of the program was and continues to be rooted in the desire for a 
credible deterrent.  The political and national security reality of the situation, however, is 
that the risk is not worth the reward.  Iran’s strategy, therefore, has shifted from one of 
seeking to provide a strategic deterrent for the purposes of national security to one of 
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using the existence of the nuclear program as a means by which to demonstrate Iran’s 
power and influence.  With the election of Ahmadinedjad in 2005, this strategy is not 
limited to the borders of Iran, but is used as a means of gaining popular support 
regionally as well. 
The Axis of Evil speech eliminated much of the progress the Khatami 
administration achieved.  Ahmadinejad’s election and the rise of the Iranian 
neoconservatives in both the Majlis and on the local councils consolidated their grip on 
national power.  Unlike either Khatami or Rafsanjani, the neoconservative foreign policy 
agenda focuses less on state-to-state relations, and more on gaining popular support.  As a 
result, Arab states are continually undermined by the actions of Iran, while those very 
actions serve to galvanize popular Arab support for Iran.  Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Jordan are particularly hard-hit by Iran’s support for the Palestinian cause, as illustrated 
by Hamas’ decision to make its first official state visit to Tehran after winning the 
election in 2006.138  Iran’s pledge of $50 million in support to the reconstruction of 
Lebanon after the war demonstrated Iran’s commitment not just to Lebanese Shia, but to 
the anti-Israel cause.  Iran’s actions, personified by Ahmadinedjad, resonate with the 
“Arab street,” if not Arab states.139  To the extent that Arab regimes are held to account 
by their populations, the favor won by Iran through such actions precludes any possibility 
of joining a U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic Republic, which is, indeed the partial 
purpose of such international support.  More importantly, however, this populist support 
provides Iran with a degree of regional moral legitimacy that cannot be ignored. 
As mentioned, this ploy to gain the support of the “Arab street” does not 
necessarily improve state-to-state relations.  Regional authoritarians, such as Hosni 
Mubarak, have responded with attempts to undermine the popular appeal of Iran, stating, 
“Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not the countries where they live.”140  Iranian 
support to the Palestinians and Hezbollah against Israel and open defiance of the U.S. has 
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far outmaneuvered Arab authoritarian regimes politically, however; regime protests 
against Iranian interference only reinforce populist Arab sentiments.  Referencing 
Egyptian protests against Iran’s meddling in “Arab affairs,” Saif al-Maskery, a former 
Omani Foreign Ministry official, stated, “Unfortunately, what is going on is Egypt is 
creating an enemy from nothing and undermining the Egyptian role.”141 
During both the pragmatist and reformist eras, Iran attempted to secure its 
national security interests and foreign policy objectives through the development of a 
strategic nuclear deterrent and by establishing good state-to-state relations with both its 
Arab neighbors, and within the broader international community.  This effort unraveled 
with the public disclosure of the nuclear facilities at Natanz and Arak, isolating Iran, 
undermining the reformist agenda within the state, and setting the conditions for a new 
foreign policy emphasizing populism, and abandoning the development of a nuclear 
weapon.  The neoconservative era under Ahmadinejad continues to pursue an ambiguous 
nuclear technology development program with the intention of increasing Iran’s prestige 
and influence.  This influence, resulting from Iran’s popular foreign policies and 
perceived defiance of the U.S., undermines Arab regimes while at the same time forcing 
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VI. CONCLUSION:  AN ARGUMENT FOR THE BEST 
EXPLANATORY FIT 
Each of the five explanations examined contain elements of truth.  They have a 
tendency to break down, however, when applied to scrutiny.  Two-level game theory 
avoids the pitfalls of each of the other explanations by taking both foreign and domestic 
considerations into account, and applying them iteratively.  Critics may object that the 
purpose of a model is to simplify, and a model that simply mirrors does not do that.  This 
is a fair objection, but one that may be answered by an analogy.  In the game of chess, 
each player seeks to anticipate the next series of moves by the opponent, but each 
individual move offers a series of counter-moves that must be taken into consideration as 
well.  The series is incalculable by the individual players—there is no such thing as a 
perfect game.  Yet there is utility in modeling sets of opposing moves.  Multiple possible 
sets may be posited—modeled—in order to game the best response to whatever is 
assessed to be the most likely course of action for the opponent.  Key to the theory is the 
complexity of iterative possibilities, which yields not only useful insights, but also the 
possibility of a well-reasoned prediction. 
Iranian foreign policy from 1979 to 2009 demonstrates the potential utility of two-
level game theory to explaining state behavior.  While this thesis avoids making 
generalizations about the predictive value of applying two-level game theory to other states, 
it does suggest potential future comparative study of highly factionalized authoritarian 
regimes.  Further, it suggests that policymakers and military officers seeking to effect 
changes in Iranian state behavior need to possess a nuanced understanding of Iran’s internal 
political workings.  The history of U.S. foreign policy towards Iran is rife with specific 
examples in which a lack of understanding—on both sides—allowed for missed opportunities 
for rapprochement.  Realism fails to yield good foreign policy towards Iran, yet pure 
factionalist, ideological, and constructivist explanations of Iranian behavior also miss the 
mark.  Two-level game theory offers a better model for U.S. policymakers and military 
officers by combining the competing imperatives of international and domestic pressures 
when considering Iran’s state behavior. 
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